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BEYOND COMPARE? A CODEFENDANT’S PRISON SENTENCE
AS A MITIGATING FACTOR IN DEATH PENALTY CASES
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier*
Abstract
This Article addresses whether the U.S. Constitution requires courts
to permit capital defendants to submit, during sentencing, the mitigating
factor that a codefendant for the same murder was sentenced to prison
instead of to death.
The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of
mitigating factors in capital cases. For the most part, litigation since the
reintroduction of capital punishment in the 1970s has clarified what
circumstances are to be weighed as mitigating. But the Court has not
addressed the current divide among lower courts regarding whether the
Eighth Amendment requires courts to allow juries to consider a
codefendant’s sentence as mitigating evidence.
This Article begins with the Supreme Court decisions regarding
mitigating factors and proportionality, noting how the Court has stressed
the importance of fairness in death penalty cases. This Article
additionally examines how courts are currently split on the issue of
whether a codefendant’s prison sentence should be weighed as a
mitigating factor. Several state courts have treated this factor as
mitigating while others have not. Although some U.S. courts of appeals
have upheld lower court decisions rejecting this mitigating factor, most
of those appellate court decisions were applying a deferential habeas
corpus standard of review to uphold the lower court decision. Thus, the
issue itself remains unresolved. This Article concludes by explaining why
logic and Supreme Court precedent dictate that courts should allow
capital defendants to present this mitigating factor to juries. Jurors should
be able to weigh the evidence and use it to make a decision when they are
choosing between a sentence of death and a sentence of life in prison.
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INTRODUCTION
Courts have long struggled with the question of how to give out the
death penalty in a fair and non-arbitrary manner. And if there is more than
one capital defendant in the same case, issues of disparity are put into
even sharper focus. When equally culpable codefendants are given
radically different sentences for the same murder—or a more culpable
defendant is given a prison sentence while a less culpable codefendant is
given a death sentence—such results damage the public’s faith in the
criminal justice system.1

1. For purposes of this Article, the term “codefendant” is used to include accomplices and
anyone involved in the same capital crime as the defendant, whether or not their cases are tried
together, tried separately, or the codefendant agrees to a plea bargain.
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For example, Great Britain executed nineteen-year-old Derek Bentley
in 1953 while sparing his accomplice, who had done the killing.2 Bentley
had shouted, “Let him have it!” to his robbery accomplice, who then shot
and killed a police officer.3 During the trial, lawyers debated whether
Bentley’s exclamation meant that his accomplice should give the gun to
the officer or whether Bentley was encouraging his accomplice to shoot.4
Bentley was convicted and executed; the young accomplice who shot the
officer received a prison sentence.5 Questions about the fairness of the
outcome, where the shooter avoided the death penalty while the
accomplice was executed, are one of the reasons that Great Britain later
abolished the death penalty.6
In one of the most famous U.S. Supreme Court death penalty cases,
the Supreme Court twice upheld the death sentence of Warren
McCleskey, who was ultimately executed in 1991.7 Although the
Supreme Court did not consider issues relating to the codefendants in
McCleskey’s case, some of the arguments in the lower courts centered on
questions about his accomplices’ role in a robbery that resulted in a police
officer being killed.8 Because no witnesses saw which one of the robbers
shot the police officer, the claim of one of McCleskey’s codefendants—
that McCleskey later admitted to the killing—constituted a key piece of
evidence against McCleskey.9 The other participants in the crime
received varying sentences, and all three were eventually released from
prison, while the state executed McCleskey in the electric chair.10 But up
until his execution, McCleskey claimed that he did not kill the police
officer during the robbery.11
2. JAMES B. CHRISTOPH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND BRITISH POLITICS 98–100 (1962).
3. Vivian Rakoff, The Death Penalty and Youth, 35 FAM. PRAC. NEWS, May 15, 2005, at 10.
4. Id. Fifteen minutes before the police officer was killed by Bentley’s robbery
accomplice, Bentley was taken into custody. See CHRISTOPH, supra note 2, at 98.
5. It is still debated today whether Bentley meant for his accomplice to shoot or to give up
the gun. Rakoff, supra note 3.
6. See Donald S. Connery, You, Me and the Death Penalty, HARTFORD COURANT (Jan. 9,
2005), https://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-xpm-2005-01-09-0501090490-story.html
[https://perma.cc/WP4C-BZV4]. In 1991, Bentley’s story was made into a movie called LET HIM
HAVE IT (British Screen Productions 1991), and in 1993, Bentley received a royal posthumous
pardon; after a rehearing on appeal in 2001, his conviction was quashed. Frederick C. Millett,
Note, Will the United States Follow England (and the Rest of the World) in Abandoning Capital
Punishment?, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 547, 572 (2007).
7. See JEFFREY L. KIRCHMEIER, IMPRISONED BY THE PAST: WARREN MCCLESKEY AND THE
AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY 179, 190–92 (2015).
8. Id. at 15–16.
9. Id. at 18–19.
10. See id. at 305–06.
11. Mark Curriden, ‘I Deeply Regret a Life Was Taken,’ ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 21,
1991, at A12. When his execution date approached, a reporter asked McCleskey what sentence
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Another execution that took place amidst questions about a
codefendant occurred when Texas executed Shareef Ahmad AbdulRahim on December 7, 1982, in the first use of lethal injection in the
United States.12 Abdul-Rahim had been convicted, with Woody Loudres,
of the crimes of kidnapping and murder. Jurors initially found both
Abdul-Rahim and Lourdes guilty of killing a man during an attempted
car theft while both defendants were intoxicated and high on heroin.13
Neither Abdul-Rahim nor Loudres said who fired the lethal shot.14 After
both defendants were initially sentenced to death, Loudres was granted a
new trial and accepted a plea bargain under which he could be released
in six-and-a-half years.15 The prosecutor from Abdul-Rahim’s trial
supported the condemned man’s appeal, asserting that it was unfair to
execute him while Loudres would not be executed.16 And on appeal,
Abdul-Rahim argued that his sentence was disproportional to Loudres’s
sentence.17 But the court rejected this argument.18 Abdul-Rahim,
convicted under his birth name, Charles Brooks Jr., became the first black
man executed in the United States since 1967.19
In a more recent example of disparity in sentencing codefendants, in
Ohio, Timothy Mosley accepted a plea deal for a sentence of life without
parole in exchange for his testimony against Austin Myers, who was
sentenced to death.20 Mosley had stabbed the victim to death while
nineteen-year-old Myers held the victim.21 Myers’s attorney argued that
Myers’s death sentence was unfair in comparison to Mosley’s life
he should have received. Id. He replied, “The appropriate punishment should be what the other
codefendants got—life in prison.” Id.
12. Rob Warden & Daniel Lennard, Death in America Under Color of Law: Our Long,
Inglorious Experience with Capital Punishment, 13 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 194, 246 (2018).
13. See FREDERICK DRIMMER, UNTIL YOU ARE DEAD: THE BOOK OF EXECUTIONS IN
AMERICA 71 (1990); Dick Reavis, Charlie Brooks’ Last Words, TEX. MONTHLY (Feb. 1983),
https://www.texasmonthly.com/articles/charlie-brooks-last-words/ [https://perma.cc/DDN56NTN]. Woodie (aka “Woody”) Loudres served eleven years in prison and was released on parole
in 1989. Jon Roberts, A Matter of Principle: Why Conservatives Should Oppose the Death
Penalty, TEX. OBSERVER (Feb. 17, 2010, 5:27 P.M.), https://www.texasobserver.org/a-matter-ofprinciple-why-conservatives-should-oppose-the-death-penalty/ [https://perma.cc/KDU9-P6Y3].
14. DRIMMER, supra note 13.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 72.
17. Warden & Lennard, supra note 12, at 247.
18. Id.
19. DRIMMER, supra note 13, at 72.
20. See Lawrence Budd, Ohio Supreme Court Questions Lawyer Arguing for Clayton
Man’s Life, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.mydaytondailynews.com/news/
crime--law/ohio-supreme-court-questions-lawyer-arguing-for-clayton-man-life/yYmSqh2armi
PLmMHtHGn3J/ [https://perma.cc/CFS2-Z74H].
21. State v. Myers, 114 N.E.3d 1138, 1154 (Ohio), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 822 (2019)
(mem.).
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sentence.22 But in 2018, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld Myers’s death
sentence, concluding that Ohio’s statute mandating proportionality
review only required such review to compare Mosley’s case to “similar
cases,” and that a codefendant who did not receive a death sentence at
trial did not fall into the category of “similar cases” for comparison.23
Not all disparate sentences end with executions. In 1977, Georgia
became the first state to exercise clemency powers in the modern death
penalty era. The Georgia Pardons Board, under Governor George Busbee,
granted clemency to Charles H. Hill because his sentence was
disproportionate to his codefendant’s.24 Hill had been sentenced to death
in 1975 even though the actual killer in the case had received a life
sentence.25 Eventually, Hill was paroled in 2008.26
Of course, murder accomplices may have different levels of
culpability in crimes, and they may have different mitigating
circumstances, so fairness does not dictate that they should always
receive the exact same sentence. But courts in recent years have struggled
with the issue of whether, in death penalty cases, a jury should be allowed
to consider the sentence of another defendant who participated in the
same murder. Although early Supreme Court cases discussed a
proportionality component of the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, the main area of debate regarding codefendants is whether
the Constitution requires that juries be permitted to weigh a codefendant’s
sentence as a mitigating factor at sentencing.
This Article explores whether a defendant has a constitutional right to
use evidence of a codefendant’s non-death sentence as mitigating
evidence in a capital sentencing hearing. Courts are divided on the issue.
In Part I, this Article begins by exploring the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence that provides a foundation for the debate. This discussion
considers the Court’s modern death penalty structure and how the Court
has evaluated arguments that the Eighth Amendment includes a
requirement that a defendant’s death sentence be proportionate to
punishments for similar crimes. Part II addresses the Court’s landmark
cases on mitigating factors, including how the Court defines “mitigation”
and when defendants have a constitutional right to submit evidence as
mitigating. Part III provides an overview of state and federal court cases
22. Budd, supra note 20.
23. Myers, 114 N.E.3d at 1185. Additionally, the Ohio Supreme Court noted Mosley’s role
in instigating and planning the murder. Id.
24. See Clemency, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/clemency
[https:// perma.cc/AE6X-F8EZ] (last updated July 20, 2018); Alan Judd, Death Row Mystery:
Why Some Inmates Get Mercy, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.ajc.com/blog/
investigations/death-row-mystery-why-some-inmates-get-mercy/IO5PdLyyKbjZ0oetKpE53L/
[https://perma.cc/L4C9-QW9D].
25. Judd, supra note 24.
26. Id.
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that have addressed the codefendant issue and the reasons they have
reached different results. Then, Part IV evaluates whether, based upon
the Court’s prior cases, the Eighth Amendment requires trial courts to
permit capital defendants to use a codefendant’s sentence as mitigating
evidence. Part IV also considers how lower courts have treated the issue,
concluding that in light of the Court’s concerns about fairness and the
role of mitigating factors, courts should allow juries to weigh such
evidence.
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S DEATH PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE ON
FAIRNESS AND PROPORTIONALITY
After the U.S. Supreme Court held in 1972 that existing death penalty
laws that gave complete discretion to sentencing jurors in capital cases
violated the Eighth Amendment, the Court evaluated new death penalty
statutes in 1976.27 These statutes and the Court’s subsequent decisions
created the modern death penalty approach. From the inception of the
modern death penalty, the Supreme Court was concerned with creating a
fair death penalty that is not imposed arbitrarily and treats similar
defendants in similar ways. The Justices wished to prevent the arbitrary
application of the death penalty and ensure fairness by allowing juries to
consider individual characteristics of defendants and their crimes. But the
question regarding how best to limit arbitrariness while also achieving
fairness remained, even as some judges and scholars concluded such a
task was impossible.28 Such a struggle goes back to the early days of the
country’s criminal justice system.
During the early years of the United States, all states followed the
English common law practice of using an automatic death penalty,
whereby courts would impose the death penalty automatically for people
found guilty of certain offenses.29 Subsequently, states began to limit the
number of crimes that made a defendant eligible for the death penalty.30
27. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196–206 (1976) (plurality opinion).
28. See, e.g., John D. Bessler, Tinkering Around the Edges: The Supreme Court’s Death
Penalty Jurisprudence, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1913, 1941 (2012); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier,
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today’s Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital
Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 346 (1998); James S. Liebman, Slow
Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 1963-2006, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 31 (2007).
29. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289, 301 (1976) (citing H. BEDAU, THE
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 5–6, 15, 27–28 (rev. ed. 1967)) (holding that a mandatory death
penalty system violates the Constitution). In the thirteenth century, English common law made all
criminal homicides “prima facie capital, but all were subject to the benefit of clergy, which after
1350 came to be available to almost any man who could read.” McGautha v. California, 402 U.S.
183, 197 (1971) (emphasis omitted).
30. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 289–90.
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Generally, though, jurisdictions automatically imposed the death penalty
for first-degree murders.31 These mandatory death penalty systems did
not allow for consideration of defendants’ individual characteristics.32
Eventually, though, many jurisdictions became concerned about
problems with such a mandatory death penalty system. For example, if
jurors found a defendant guilty but did not believe the defendant should
be executed, the jury might vote to acquit the defendant as the only way
to save the accused’s life.33 So, around the mid-1800s, states began
moving toward having discretionary death penalties.34 The justification
for the change was that it would limit jury nullification and create a fairer
death penalty system that allowed jurors to consider mercy based on
individual characteristics of capital defendants and their crimes.35 But
historians note that southern states were also motivated to give jurors
discretion because all-white juries would be more lenient toward white
defendants and harsher toward African-American defendants.36
Still, by the 1960s, the federal government, and every state that used
juries (as opposed to judges) for capital sentencing, allowed the jurors to
use their discretion in deciding whether to impose capital punishment.37
However, this shift to allow jurors to use their discretion created another
problem. Because the laws gave so much discretion to jurors, defense
attorneys raised challenges asserting that this discretion made the use of
the death penalty more arbitrary.38 The issue eventually made it to the
Supreme Court.
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia,39 a majority of the Supreme Court
Justices in a per curiam opinion held that the death sentences in the three
cases at issue violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.40 With
each of the nine Justices writing separate opinions, several of the Justices
in the majority focused on the arbitrary use of the punishment.41 For
example, Justice Douglas stressed that the capital punishment laws before
the Court were “pregnant with discrimination” against minorities and the
31. See id. at 289; McGautha, 402 U.S. at 198.
32. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
33. See, e.g., KIRCHMEIER, supra note 7, at 58.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See WILLIAM J. BOWERS ET AL., LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA,
1864–1982, at 174 (1984).
39. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
40. Id. at 239–40.
41. Id. at 240; cf. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 196 (1971) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment is not violated when a capital sentencing jury is not given guiding
factors), vacated sub nom. Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972).
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underprivileged.42 Justice Stewart analogized the process of selecting the
condemned to the randomness of a lightning strike.43 Although the
Justices in the majority did not agree on a specific reasoning, the Court
concluded that the death penalty statutes were unconstitutional,44
effectively putting a halt to all executions in the United States.45
In response to Furman, states began writing new death penalty laws
that legislators hoped would avoid the constitutional problems implicated
by statutes that gave jurors complete discretion.46 These new statutes
generally took one of two approaches. Some made the death penalty
mandatory for defendants convicted of specific capital crimes.47 Others
were designed to leave some discretion to the capital sentencing jurors
while giving them questions or factors to provide guidance.48 Most of
these “guided discretion” statutes permitted jurors or sentencing judges
to weigh specific aggravating factors, which support a death sentence,
against mitigating factors.49
Then, in 1976, the Court addressed cases from states that had enacted
these new death penalty laws. In one group of cases, a majority of the
Court found the mandatory death penalty statutes unconstitutional.50 In
other cases, a majority of the Justices upheld the guided discretion
statutes.51
In Gregg v. Georgia,52 one of the guided discretion statute cases, the
Court examined Georgia’s law featuring a bifurcated system that
contained specific aggravating and mitigating factors for a jury to
consider.53 The Plurality concluded that Georgia’s law provided jurors

42. Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart concluded that the Eighth
Amendment does not permit capital punishment “to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.”
Id. at 310.
44. See id. at 239–40.
45. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
AMERICAN AGENDA 37 (1986) (“The Justices entered similar orders in 120 other death penalty
appeals pending before the Court and effectively prevented the execution of all prisoners on death
row at the time.”).
46. BOWERS ET AL., supra note 38.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. See, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
51. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206–07 (1976) (plurality opinion); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259 (1976). The Court also
held that the death penalty per se does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169.
52. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
53. Id. at 164–65 (plurality opinion).
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with adequate guidance through “clear and objective standards.”54 On the
same day, in Jurek v. Texas55 and Proffitt v. Florida,56 the Court upheld
other guided sentencing statutes.57
Subsequent cases clarified and continue to clarify the roles of
aggravating and mitigating factors in capital cases. More recently, in
2016, the Supreme Court in Kansas v. Carr58 held that the Constitution
does not require judges to inform juries about the burden of proof for
mitigating circumstances.59 Justice Scalia reasoned that whether a fact is
mitigating is not a factual finding but “largely a judgment call (or perhaps
a value call)” where weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances
involves “mostly a question of mercy.”60 Yet, even as the Court continues
to fine-tune capital punishment doctrine, the 1976 cases laid out the basic
constitutional requirements for capital sentencing that provide the main
procedures used in U.S. courts today.
At the heart of the Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis in Furman and
the landmark 1976 cases lies the concept that the death penalty should be
applied fairly. Underlying the procedural requirements surrounding the
use of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the Court has often
stressed that capital punishment should be proportional to the crime and
the individual.
For example, the Supreme Court held in Enmund v. Florida61 in 1982
and in Tison v. Arizona62 in 1987, that in some situations the death penalty
is not a proportional punishment for felony murderers.63 In Enmund, the
defendant served as a getaway driver during a robbery-murder, and the
trial judge, following a jury’s recommendation, sentenced the defendant
to death.64 The Supreme Court held that the death sentence violated the
Eighth Amendment because the State did not prove that the felonymurder defendant killed, attempted to kill, or “intended or contemplated
that life would be taken.”65
54. Id. at 197–98 (quoting Coley v. State, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (Ga. 1974)).
55. 428 U.S. 262 (1976). Texas’s scheme was somewhat unique in that the statute provided
three questions for jurors to answer when they were determining whether to sentence a capital
defendant to death. See id. at 269 (plurality opinion).
56. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
57. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276 (plurality opinion); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 259 (plurality opinion).
58. 136 S. Ct. 633 (2016).
59. Id. at 642–43.
60. Id. at 642. In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia noted, “[i]n the last analysis, jurors
will accord mercy if they deem it appropriate, and withhold mercy if they do not, which is what
our case law is designed to achieve.” Id.
61. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
62. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
63. See id. at 158; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801.
64. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 784–85.
65. Id. at 801.
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In its Eighth Amendment analysis, the Enmund Court considered
whether society accepts the use of the death penalty for defendants who
did not kill. It did so by weighing decisions by legislatures, juries, and
prosecutors.66 Additionally, the Court evaluated whether the execution of
such defendants serves the punishment goals of deterrence and
retribution.67 Ultimately, the Court stressed that the punishment must be
proportionate to the defendant’s crime and required courts to do
additional analysis before imposing a death sentence on defendants who
did not actually kill.68 The Court concluded that the felony-murder
defendant’s “criminal culpability must be limited to his participation in
the robbery, and his punishment must be tailored to his personal
responsibility and moral guilt.”69
In another Eighth Amendment felony-murder case about culpability,
the Court in Tison v. Arizona expanded upon Enmund’s proportionality
requirement. The Court addressed the death sentences of two brothers
who had helped their father and another inmate escape from prison.70
While the group was on the run, they abducted a family. 71 After getting
water to leave with the abducted family in the desert, the brothers
watched their father and the other escapee kill the family.72
As in Enmund, the Tison Court considered state capital punishment
statutes to assess “the state legislatures’ judgment as to proportionality in
these circumstances” where a felony-murder defendant did not actually
kill anyone.73 The Court also again considered the importance of
individual mental culpability in assessing the appropriateness of the death
penalty.74 Ultimately, the Court found “that major participation in the
felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is
sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement.”75
Similarly, the Court has held that the death penalty is not a
proportionate punishment for crimes like rape where the victim is not

66. Id. at 789–96.
67. Id. at 798.
68. Id. at 801.
69. Id.
70. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 138–39 (1987).
71. Id. at 140.
72. Id. at 141.
73. Id. at 152. The Tison Court evaluated the number of states that allowed the death penalty
for felony-murder cases. Id. at 152–54. It concluded that “substantial and recent legislative
authorization of the death penalty for the crime of felony murder regardless of the absence of a
finding of an intent to kill powerfully suggests that our society does not reject the death penalty
as grossly excessive under these circumstances.” Id. at 154.
74. Id. at 156–57.
75. Id. at 158.
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killed. In Coker v. Georgia,76 a plurality held in 1977 that the use of the
death penalty for the rape of an adult woman “is grossly disproportionate
and excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is therefore forbidden
by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment.”77 Three
decades later in Kennedy v. Louisiana,78 the Court reinforced that
conclusion by holding that the Eighth Amendment does not permit the
use of the death penalty for the crime of raping a child where the crime
did not result, and was not intended to result, in the death of the child.79
In these proportionality cases, the Court stressed that the punishment
of the death penalty must be proportional in relation to the crime
generally.80 But the Court did not state that the Constitution requires strict
proportionality between the punishment of death and an individual’s
crime. Thus, one proportionality issue left open by the 1976 death penalty
cases was whether the Eighth Amendment required appellate courts to
compare an individual capital defendant’s case to other capital and
noncapital cases to determine whether the death penalty was proportional
to that individual and the individual’s crime.81
States, interpreting Supreme Court precedent, struggled with this
issue. Since Furman had stressed that it was important that the death
penalty be applied fairly, some states included proportionality review in
their new death penalty statutes. In Gregg, the three-Justice plurality and
the three-Justice concurring opinion both emphasized that Georgia’s
system had a statutorily required comparative proportionality review.82
Similarly, the Justices in Proffitt noted that in Florida, case law required
reviewing courts to do a comparative proportionality review to ensure a
defendant’s sentence was consistent with sentences in similar cases.83
Despite the emphasis on state-required proportionality review in those
1976 cases, the Court has not held that individual proportionality review
76. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
77. Id. at 592.
78. 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
79. See id. at 421. The Court stressed “that capital punishment must ‘be limited to those
offenders who commit “a narrow category of the most serious crimes” and whose extreme
culpability makes them “the most deserving of execution.”’” Id. at 420 (quoting Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005)).
80. See, e.g., id. at 445–46.
81. Although the process may vary by jurisdiction, in jurisdictions that perform a
proportionality review, a court must define the group of cases that are part of the review, then it
must select the cases similar to the case being appealed, and finally, it must determine whether
the case being appealed is proportional when compared to the pool of similar cases. See Timothy
V. Kaufman-Osborn, Capital Punishment, Proportionality Review, and Claims of Fairness (with
Lessons from Washington State), 79 WASH. L. REV. 775, 794 (2004).
82. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198, 204–06 (1976) (plurality opinion); id. at 222–23
(White, J., concurring).
83. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 250–51 (1976).
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is required for a constitutional death penalty system.84 Additionally, in
Jurek, the Court upheld Texas’s sentencing scheme, which did not
contain a comparative proportionality review.85
Eventually, the Court addressed the issue more directly. In 1984, in
Pulley v. Harris,86 the Supreme Court evaluated whether the Eighth
Amendment requires states to include a proportionality review in their
death penalty review process.87 In examining the 1976 cases, the Court
recalled that it had approved Texas’s death penalty even though the state
did not have comparative proportionality review.88 The Court also noted
that in Zant v. Stephens89 the Court had considered proportionality review
“to be an additional safeguard against arbitrarily imposed death
sentences, but we certainly did not hold that comparative review was
constitutionally required.”90
Thus, the Court in Harris concluded that comparative proportionality
review by an appellate court is not required in every death penalty case.91
The Court did leave open the possibility that the Eighth Amendment
might require a state appellate court to conduct a proportionality review
if the state’s death penalty system is not otherwise constitutionally
sufficient.92 But addressing the California death penalty, the Court held
that the Constitution does not additionally require appellate
proportionality review under that state’s existing capital punishment
system.93
Although California’s system did not have such review, Justice
Brennan pointed out in his dissenting opinion that more than thirty states
required some form of comparative proportionality review, either by
84. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 44–48 (1984).
85. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268–69 (1976); see also Harris, 465 U.S. at 48.
86. 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
87. Id. at 43–44.
88. Id. at 48.
89. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
90. Harris, 465 U.S. at 50.
91. Id. at 50–51 (“There is thus no basis in our cases for holding that comparative
proportionality review by an appellate court is required in every case in which the death penalty
is imposed and the defendant requests it.”).
92. Id. at 51 (“Assuming that there could be a capital sentencing system so lacking in other
checks on arbitrariness that it would not pass constitutional muster without comparative
proportionality review, the 1977 California statute is not of that sort.”).
93. The Court noted that the California statute did not describe the nature of the appeal for
a death penalty case, but the statute contained other procedures at sentencing that protected the
rights of capital defendants. Id. at 53. These procedures included the requirement that at trial
special circumstances must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, that at the sentencing stage the
trier of fact considers aggravating and mitigating circumstances, that upon motion the trial judge
will review a jury’s sentence of death, and that if the death sentence is upheld there is an automatic
appeal. Id. at 51–53.
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judicial decision or by statute.94 In looking at the cases reversed on
proportionality grounds in those states, Justice Brennan responded to the
majority that such review helps “to eliminate some, if only a small part,
of the irrationality that currently infects imposition of the death penalty
by the various States.”95
Although Harris only directly addressed the death penalty procedures
in California, the decision had a broader impact. State courts that had
been performing proportionality review in capital cases soon began
abandoning or watering down the practice.96
Yet, some jurisdictions still do require a form of comparative
proportionality review. As such, sometimes the issue arises as to whether
a codefendant’s sentence should be evaluated as some sort of
proportionality review instead of the issue of whether it should be
weighed as a mitigating factor. This Article mainly focuses on the
mitigating factor aspect, but it is worth noting that a codefendant’s
sentence may have constitutional significance for a court’s
proportionality analysis too.97
After Harris, states still were free to implement the extra protections
of comparative proportionality review even if the Eighth Amendment did
not require such review.98 For example, by statute, states such as
Tennessee require proportionality review as part of a direct appeal of a
death sentence.99 And, in jurisdictions like Idaho that mandate
94. Id. at 71 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 73.
96. See Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State High Courts
After Gregg: Only “the Appearance of Justice”?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 130, 150–51
(1996); see also Bidish Sarma, Furman’s Resurrection: Proportionality Review and the Supreme
Court’s Second Chance to Fulfill Furman’s Promise, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 238,
242, http://cardozolawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/SARMA_2009_238.pdf [https://
perma.cc/F97B-RHMB] (indicating that state courts are moving “away from robust
proportionality review”).
97. Another argument for why a jury or a court should evaluate a codefendant’s sentence is
that the Eighth Amendment, common law, or both prohibit inconsistent jury verdicts. See, e.g.,
Getsy v. Mitchell, 456 F.3d 575, 591–92 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that the death sentence for a
person who had been hired to commit the murder violated the Eighth Amendment when the person
who hired him was sentenced to prison), vacated, No. 03-3200, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 32577
(6th Cir. Nov. 22, 2006). For more on the rule of consistency, see United States v. Powell, 469
U.S. 57, 66 (1984); Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680, 682 n.3 (1944); Morrison v. California,
291 U.S. 82, 87–90 (1934).
98. See State v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342, 376 (Utah 2001) (“[C]ase-by-case proportionality
review is not required under the United States or Utah Constitution.”), denial of post-conviction
relief aff’d, 175 P.3d 530 (Utah 2007).
99. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) (2018) (stating that the appellate court is
to consider whether each death sentence “is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed
in similar cases, considering both the nature of the crime and the defendant”). Washington and
Delaware have a similar proportionality provision in their state statutes, although the death
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proportionality review by statute, courts have considered codefendants’
sentences in determining whether a death sentence is disproportionate or
unjust.100 The Montana Supreme Court has similarly weighed
codefendants’ sentences as part of a state statutory proportionality
review.101
Some decisions on proportionality review, however, have pointed out
that it is the role of the appellate court, not the jury, to perform such
review. For example, the Court of Appeals of Virginia has noted that
“[u]nder the mandated statutory review of capital cases, the Supreme
Court must compare the sentence in a particular case to similar cases, but
a jury has no such responsibility.”102
During the time that New Jersey had the death penalty, the state had
one of the most rigorous proportionality review systems in the country.
Like many other states, when New Jersey passed a new death penalty law
after Furman, its law required the state supreme court, in every death
penalty case, to determine whether the sentence was disproportionate to
the punishment in similar cases.103 Although the New Jersey Legislature
eventually attempted to weaken the importance of such review, in 1991
penalties in those states were recently held to be unconstitutional for unrelated reasons. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(g) (2019) (stating that the Delaware Supreme Court should determine
“[w]hether, considering the totality of evidence in aggravation and mitigation . . . the death penalty
was either arbitrarily or capriciously imposed or recommended, or disproportionate to the penalty
recommended or imposed in similar cases arising under this section”), invalidated by Rauf v.
State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016); Clark v. State, 672 A.2d 1004, 1010–11 (Del. 1996) (en banc)
(applying the proportionality review required by Delaware’s statute). Although Washington
state’s death penalty recently was found unconstitutional in State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 626
(Wash. 2018), when Washington had the death penalty, a state statute required proportionality
review. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.130(2)(b) (2018) (requiring the Washington Supreme
Court to determine “[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant”), invalidated by Gregory,
427 P.3d 621.
100. See State v. Hoffman, 851 P.2d 934, 943–44 (Idaho 1993) (holding that the defendant’s
death sentence was not disproportionate or unjust in light of a codefendant’s sentence); State v.
McKinney, 687 P.2d 570, 576 (Idaho 1984) (noting that under proportionality review required by
statute, the differences in the sentences between the defendant and codefendant were “justified by
the varying degrees of involvement in the crime”), dismissal of post-conviction relief aff’d, 992
P.2d 144 (Idaho 1999), and denial of post-conviction relief aff’d, 291 P.3d 1036 (Idaho 2013),
and dismissal of post-conviction relief aff’d, 396 P.3d 1168 (Idaho 2017).
101. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 705 P.2d 1087, 1108 (Mont. 1985).
102. Walker v. Commonwealth, 486 S.E.2d 126, 134 (Va. Ct. App. 1997), abrogated by
Fishback v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629 (Va. 2000); see also Lewis v. Commonwealth, 593
S.E.2d 220, 227 (Va. 2004) (“[U]pon our prior determinations of excessiveness and
disproportionality, we have rejected efforts by defendants to compare their sentences with those
received by confederates.” (quoting Murphy v. Commonwealth, 431 S.E.2d 48, 53 (Va. 1993))).
103. 1982 N.J. Laws 555, 558 (codified as amended at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West
2018)).
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the New Jersey Supreme Court began a Proportionality Review Project
that created “the most elaborate statistical proportionality review process
in the nation.”104 Through the years, proportionality review by the New
Jersey Supreme Court helped reduce the number of death sentences, and
it likely contributed to the state ultimately abolishing the death penalty.105
Other states have yet to follow New Jersey’s history of extensive analysis
in death penalty cases of comparing capital and noncapital cases.
Further, even in states that perform a proportionality review, courts
stress that there is no requirement that defendants and codefendants be
sentenced alike.106 Different defendants may have different culpabilities,
and courts may be reluctant to engage in comparing sentences without
going into a detailed analysis of the codefendants’ mitigating and
aggravating factors.107 A further question is whether juries are capable of
doing that type of analysis when weighing mitigating factors.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES IN CAPITAL CASES
In 1976, when the Supreme Court upheld the death penalty statutes in
Gregg, Jurek, and Proffit, the Court also struck down mandatory death
penalty statutes as violating the Eighth Amendment in Woodson v. North
Carolina108 and in Roberts v. Louisiana.109 The Woodson and Roberts
cases stressed the importance of individualized sentencing and the role of
mitigating factors presented by capital defendants.110
104. Barry Latzer, The Failure of Comparative Proportionality Review of Capital Cases
(With Lessons from New Jersey), 64 ALB. L. REV. 1161, 1197–98 (2001).
105. George W. Conk, Herald of Change? New Jersey’s Repeal of the Death Penalty, 33
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 21, 33–41 (2008).
106. See, e.g., State v. Gamble, 63 So. 3d 707, 726 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010). The court noted
that Alabama has a statute requiring appellate courts to do proportionality review in capital cases.
Id. at 728–29. But, “[t]he law does not require that each person involved in a crime receive the
same sentence.” Id. at 726 (quoting Ex Parte McWhorter, 781 So. 2d 330 (Ala. 2000)).
107. See Issa v. Bradshaw, No. 1:03-cv-280, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121867, at *88–90 (S.D.
Ohio Nov. 5, 2008) (finding the fact that defendant received a death sentence and the actual
shooter only received life imprisonment was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of
federal law on habeas review); Harlow v. State, 70 P.3d 179, 203–05 (Wyo. 2003) (finding that
the defendant’s sentence was not disproportionate to his two codefendants’ sentences), denial of
post-conviction relief aff’d, 105 P.3d 1049 (Wyo. 2005); see also Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d
43, 63 (Wyo. 1983) (“Accomplices in crime need not be sentenced alike; a sentence should be
patterned to the individual defendant.”).
108. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
109. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
110. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. In Roberts, the plurality explained that the crime of
intentional murder of a police officer could not result in a mandatory death sentence. Roberts, 428
U.S. at 335–36. More than ten years later, as in Woodson and Roberts, the Court struck down a
mandatory death penalty statute in Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 85 (1987).
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The Woodson plurality noted that historically, mandatory death
sentences created problems—including jury nullification.111 Thus, the
Court reasoned that in death penalty cases the Eighth Amendment
“requires consideration of the character and record of the individual
offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty
of death.”112 Individualized sentencing in capital cases is required
because there is an increased need for reliability: “[T]he penalty of death
is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however
long.”113 To ensure individualized sentencing, the Court concluded that a
defendant has a constitutional right to present mitigating evidence to
jurors.114 Woodson and Roberts, however, did not clarify how broad the
command was, only that courts had to allow defendants to present at least
some mitigating factors.115
Subsequent cases clarified the constitutional significance of
mitigating circumstances. In Lockett v. Ohio,116 the Supreme Court found
Ohio’s death penalty statute unconstitutional because it limited the
mitigating factors a capital jury could weigh.117 Echoing language from
Woodson, the Lockett plurality concluded that a sentencing jury should
“not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of
a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death.”118
The Supreme Court further stressed the broad command from Lockett
in subsequent cases. For example, in Skipper v. South Carolina,119 the
Court included evidence unrelated to the crime in the definition of
“mitigating evidence” when it held that a trial court could not exclude
evidence that the defendant had adjusted to incarceration.120 The Court
noted that from such evidence a jury might have “drawn favorable
inferences” with respect to the defendant’s character and probable future
conduct.121 Thus, “[a]lthough it is true that any such inferences would not
111. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 294 n.29.
112. Id. at 304.
113. Id. at 305.
114. Id. at 304.
115. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 333–34; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
116. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
117. Id. at 608.
118. Id. at 604.
119. 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
120. Id. at 4 (“Equally clear is the corollary rule that the sentencer may not refuse to consider
or be precluded from considering ‘any relevant mitigating evidence.’” (quoting Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982))).
121. Id.
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relate specifically to petitioner’s culpability for the crime he committed,
there is no question but that such inferences would be ‘mitigating’ in the
sense that they might serve ‘as a basis for a sentence less than death.’”122
Similarly, in Eddings v. Oklahoma,123 the Court found other evidence
not directly related to the crime to be mitigating. In that case, the Court
found that evidence of a capital defendant’s troubled youth must be
admitted for consideration during sentencing.124 Therefore, death penalty
statutes must allow for the consideration of mitigating circumstances
about the offense and the defendant’s character. Further, statutes and
judges cannot limit consideration of the factors.125 Sentencers must be
permitted to consider any information about “the circumstances of the
offense together with the character and propensities of the offender.”126
The Supreme Court has consistently used broad language to define
what circumstances constitute mitigating factors.127 For example, in
McKoy v. North Carolina,128 the Court stressed that evidence is
mitigating and cannot be constitutionally barred “if the sentencer could
122. Id. at 4–5 (citation omitted) (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604). The Court added that
“[c]onsideration of a defendant’s past conduct as indicative of his probable future behavior is an
inevitable and not undesirable element of criminal sentencing.” Id. at 5.
123. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
124. Id. at 115.
125. See Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398–99 (1987) (holding that the trial judge’s
instruction that did not allow the advisory jury to weigh nonstatutory mitigating factors violated
the Constitution); see also Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 77–78 (1987) (clarifying that even in
a situation where a life-sentenced prisoner commits murder, mitigation still must be considered
during a capital sentencing hearing).
126. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 112 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937)).
127. Yet, the Court has implied that there might be some limits on what mitigation a
sentencer is required to consider under the Constitution. In Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993),
the Court evaluated Texas’s capital sentencing statute that presented special questions to jurors
instead of a list of aggravating and mitigating factors. Id. at 354 (noting that the trial court
instructed the jury to answer two issues in conformity with TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
32.071(b) (West 1981), including whether “the conduct of the Defendant . . . that caused the death
of the deceased” was “committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death
of the deceased or another would result,” and whether there is “a probability that the
Defendant . . . would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat
to society”). At the time, Texas’s death penalty statute did not specifically provide for mitigating
factors to be considered outside of these questions. Id. Johnson, who was nineteen at the time of
the murder, argued that the sentencing questions did not allow the jury to consider youth as a
mitigating factor. Id. at 353, 358, 366. The Court, however, held that Lockett only requires that a
jury be permitted to weigh mitigating evidence and that the jury does not have to “be able to give
effect to mitigating evidence in every conceivable manner in which the evidence might be
relevant.” Id. at 372. Thus, the Court upheld the death sentence because the mitigating factor of
youth could be considered in at least one way—how it affected the defendant’s future
dangerousness. Id. at 371, 373.
128. 494 U.S. 433 (1990).
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reasonably find that it warrants a sentence less than death.”129 In that case,
the Court approvingly cited the following definition from the North
Carolina Supreme Court Chief Justice: “Relevant mitigating evidence is
evidence which tends logically to prove or disprove some fact or
circumstance which a fact-finder could reasonably deem to have
mitigating value.”130 Further, evidence may still be relevant to mitigation
even if it does not excuse a defendant’s conduct.131
Generally, death-penalty states’ sentencing statutes list some
mitigating factors. But because the Constitution does not allow states to
preclude consideration of mitigating factors,132 lower courts are often
asked to consider what factors are mitigating under the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has not provided definitive guidance
as to what specific factors should be mitigating or why some factors are
mitigating. Thus, on a case-by-case basis, lower courts have further
developed the law of mitigating circumstances.
In making the legal and moral determination of whether a defendant
should be executed, jurors consider certain mitigating factors presented
by the defendant and approved by the trial court. And as discussed above,
the Supreme Court has stated that a sentencer must “not be precluded
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”133
The definition is broad, although occasionally courts find that specific
evidence does not constitute a mitigating circumstance.134 Still, courts
129. Id. at 441 (first citing Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986); and then citing
Eddings, 455 U.S. 104).
130. Id. at 440 (quoting State v. McKoy, 372 S.E.2d 12, 45 (N.C. 1988) (Exum, C.J.,
dissenting)).
131. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113–16.
132. Many state statutes explicitly incorporate the command of Lockett that all mitigating
evidence must be considered by including a catch-all provision among the list of specific statutory
mitigating circumstances. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(k) (West 2018) (“Any other
circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for
the crime.”); COLO. REV. STAT. 18-1.3-1201(4)(l) (2018) (“Any other evidence which in the
court’s opinion bears on the question of mitigation.”); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(7)(h) (2018) (“The
existence of any other factors in the defendant’s background that would mitigate against
imposition of the death penalty.”); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9 (c)(8) (2018) (“Any other
circumstances appropriate for consideration.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(9) (2018) (“Any
other circumstance arising from the evidence which the jury deems to have mitigating value.”).
133. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (emphasis omitted).
134. Below are some examples of cases where courts found evidence did not constitute a
mitigating factor. See, e.g., Madison v. State, 718 So. 2d 90, 96 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (holding
that evidence from a defense expert that the defendant suffered from delusional and thought
disorders was insufficient to support the mitigating circumstance of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance), aff’d sub nom. ex parte Madison, 718 So. 2d 104 (Ala. 1998), denial of post-
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and legislatures have found a significant number of factors that should be
considered mitigating in capital cases.
Generally, mitigating factors may be grouped into four categories: (1)
mitigating circumstances unrelated to the crime that show that the
defendant has some good qualities; (2) mitigating circumstances that
show less culpability, that help explain why a defendant committed the
crime, or both; (3) mitigating circumstances that show the defendant had
a lesser involvement with the murder; and (4) mitigating circumstances
related to the legal proceedings.135
The first category, regarding a defendant’s good qualities, is used to
illustrate the defendant has done some good, revealing that the defendant
is a human being who is worth saving from the death penalty.136 The
second category includes factors that help explain why the defendant
might be less culpable or that might evoke sympathy.137 A defendant who
suffered severe abuse as a child is not excused for later committing a
crime, but that fact might provide some context as to why the defendant
ended up committing crimes. Like all mitigating factors, these do not
mean that the defendant should not be punished; they merely support that
the punishment should be life in prison instead of the death penalty.138
The third category focuses on the circumstances of the crime.139 For
example, it would be mitigating if a defendant had codefendants who
were more culpable in the murder. One might argue that the defendant
should be sentenced to life in prison because of that defendant’s lesser

conviction relief aff’d, 999 So. 2d 561 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006); State v. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d
55, 115 (N.J. 1999) (holding that a capital defendant’s alleged offer to plead guilty in exchange
for a life sentence was not a mitigating factor), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 2011 WL 2326967
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 14, 2011); State v. Morton, 715 A.2d 228, 270 (N.J. 1998) (holding
that parole ineligibility is not a mitigating factor); State v. Torres, 713 A.2d 1, 18 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1998) (holding that a sixteen-year-old defendant’s age was not a mitigating factor
because the crime was not of a nature consistent with youth), denial of post-conviction relief aff’d,
2007 WL 2005047 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 12, 2007), and denial of post-conviction relief
aff’d, No. A-2225-15T4 A-5597-15T4, 2018 WL 1056252 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 7,
2018); State v. Clark, 990 P.2d 793, 805–06 (N.M. 1999) (holding that the fact that the former
governor had commuted prior death sentences to life imprisonment was not a mitigating factor,
that the opinions of friends or relatives of the defendant that defendant should not be sentenced to
death are not mitigating circumstances, and that the testimony of religious leaders and lawyers as
to the propriety of the death sentence was not relevant mitigating evidence).
135. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, A Tear in the Eye of the Law: Mitigating Factors and
the Progression Toward a Disease Theory of Criminal Justice, 83 OR. L. REV. 631, 658–87 (2004)
(categorizing mitigating factors from around the United States).
136. Id. at 664–65.
137. Id. at 671.
138. See id. at 664.
139. Id. at 665–72.
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involvement in the murder. Similarly, other circumstances surrounding
the crime might support arguments for a lesser sentence than death.140
Finally, the fourth category of mitigating factors includes factors that
are based on aspects of the capital prosecution that go toward making the
prosecution fairer.141 For example, some courts have found that a
recommendation of life in prison by a prosecutor or by the victim’s family
is mitigating.142
For another example of a factor related to legal proceedings, some
judges have suggested that a difference in jurisdiction that would affect
the sentence should be mitigating. In United States v. Gabrion,143 a
defendant was prosecuted under federal law because the victim’s body
was found in a national forest.144 But had the body been outside the forest,
the defendant would not have been eligible for the death penalty because
under Michigan state law there is no death penalty.145 Initially, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a capital jury should have
been allowed to consider the mitigating factor that the state did not have
the death penalty.146 The appeals court later granted a rehearing and
reversed the earlier decision, but Judge Karen Moore’s dissent reasserted,
“When the location of the crime is what makes a defendant eligible for

140. See id.
141. Id. at 672–73. In addition to the factors discussed above, two other factors that might fit
in this category are the factors of whether the defendant is ineligible for parole and the length of
legal proceedings. Regarding parole ineligibility, at least in cases where the prosecution has
placed the defendant’s “future dangerousness” at issue, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment gives the defendant the right to inform the jury that she or he is ineligible for parole
if sentenced to life in prison. Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 51 (2001); Simmons v. South
Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 171 (1994). The factor is listed here, though arguably it is not a mitigating
factor, but more like rebuttal to the aggravating factor of future dangerousness. Regarding the
length of legal proceedings factor, in State v. Adamson, 665 P.2d 972 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc),
while upholding a death sentence, the court considered the length of the legal proceedings in the
case as a mitigating factor. Id. at 989.
142. See, e.g., Jeffers v. Ricketts, 627 F. Supp. 1334, 1357–59 (D. Ariz. 1986) (noting that
the prosecutor offered a plea bargain that did not involve a death sentence), aff’d, 38 F.3d 411
(9th Cir. 1994); State v. White, 982 P.2d 819, 825, 831 (Ariz. 1999) (affirming the death sentence
but holding that the trial judge erred by not finding a mitigating circumstance that the two
prosecutors did not believe that death was the appropriate sentence); see also Ferguson v. State,
814 So. 2d 925, 959 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (noting that the trial court found the nonstatutory
mitigating factor that the jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole), aff’d sub nom. ex parte Ferguson, 814 So.2d 970 (Ala. 2001), dismissal of
post-conviction relief aff’d, 13 So.3d 418 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008).
143. 648 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 2011), vacated, No. 02-1386/1461/1570, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS
23290 (6th Cir. Nov. 17, 2011), and reh’g en banc 719 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2013).
144. Id. at 316.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 323–24.
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the death penalty in the first place, the location becomes a ‘circumstance
of the offense’ that could justify a sentence less than death.”147
A final mitigating factor, which could belong in either the third or the
fourth category, is the topic of this Article: that a codefendant has
received a life sentence. This factor arguably relates to the fairness of the
criminal proceeding and to the circumstances of the crime. Courts are
divided on whether this factor should be mitigating, with some courts
concluding that the factor does not qualify under the Supreme Court’s
definition of a mitigating factor: “any aspect of a defendant’s character
or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”148 The next part
discusses how states and lower courts have addressed this issue.
III. DOES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT REQUIRE JURIES TO CONSIDER A
CODEFENDANT’S SENTENCE AS A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE?
The Supreme Court has not expressly addressed whether the Eighth
Amendment requires that a defendant be allowed to introduce a
codefendant’s non-death sentence as a mitigating factor in a capital case.
As noted above, however, the Court often has used broad language in
favor of allowing juries to consider anything that might be mitigating.
In at least one instance, the Court arguably implied approval of
considering a codefendant’s non-death sentence as a mitigating factor. In
Parker v. Dugger,149 the Court held that the Florida Supreme Court did
not properly review a capital sentence because the state court incorrectly
found that the trial judge had not found any nonstatutory mitigating
factors.150 The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the trial court must
have found some nonstatutory mitigating factors even if the trial court’s
order was ambiguous.151 In making its conclusion, the Court noted that
the defendant’s attorney had argued several mitigating factors at the
sentencing hearing, including that none of the accomplices were
sentenced to death.152
In analyzing how the state courts had evaluated mitigating
circumstances, the Supreme Court noted that the defendant’s
“nonstatutory mitigating evidence—drug and alcohol intoxication, more
lenient sentencing for the perpetrator of the crime, character and
background—was of a type that the Florida Supreme Court had in other

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 540 (Moore, J., dissenting).
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
498 U.S. 308 (1991).
Id. at 322–23.
Id. at 314–15.
Id. at 314.
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cases found sufficient to preclude a jury override.”153 The Court further
explained, “The trial judge must have at least taken this evidence into
account before passing sentence.”154
By listing the sentencing of another person as a factor that the trial
judge must have considered, the Court’s reasoning seems to support its
approval of the mitigating circumstance. On the other hand, one might
argue that the Court was only recognizing that the factor was mitigating
under state law.155 Thus, the decision in Parker gives some insight into
the Court’s view, but it does not definitively resolve the issue.
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly addressed whether
courts must weigh a codefendant’s non-death sentence as mitigating,
some legislatures and several lower courts have addressed the issue.
Indeed, regardless of the U.S. Constitution, states—through statutes or
through interpretation of a state constitution—may require that a
defendant be able to use such mitigating evidence.
But, because Lockett held that states may not prevent a defendant from
presenting evidence that is mitigating, the issue remains whether states
are required to allow evidence of a codefendant’s sentence to be
considered as a nonstatutory mitigating factor. The courts are not uniform
on the issue.
A. Jurisdictions Holding that a Codefendant’s Sentence Is
Mitigating Evidence
As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted, courts
are divided on the issue of whether the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments dictate that a defendant may submit evidence of a
codefendant’s sentence as mitigation. In Frey v. Fulcomer,156 in
evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for counsel’s failure
to attempt to introduce a codefendant’s sentence as mitigating, the court
recognized that Pennsylvania law did not allow such mitigating
evidence.157 But “[i]t remains less clear whether the federal constitution
(specifically the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments) requires that
codefendants’ sentences must be admitted as mitigating evidence in a

153. Id. at 315.
154. Id.
155. The Supreme Court in Parker, however, did note that the state court could not decline
to consider mitigating evidence as a matter of “both federal and Florida law.” Parker, 498 U.S. at
315.
156. 974 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1992).
157. Id. at 366.
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death penalty hearing.”158 The court, however, reasoned that it did not
need to resolve the mitigating issue for the case before it.159
In contrast to federal courts,160 several state courts have allowed a
capital defendant to use a codefendant’s sentence as a mitigating factor,
including courts in Arizona,161 Colorado,162 Delaware,163 Florida,164

158. Id. The court did note that Parker v. Dugger did not require consideration of such
evidence as part of proportionality review. Id. at 366 n.22.
159. Id. at 366. Notably, the federal capital sentencing statute allows consideration of a
codefendant’s sentence when the defendant and codefendant are “equally culpable.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3592(a)(4) (2012).
160. As discussed in the next part, generally federal courts have declined to require that
courts allow a defendant to present a codefendant’s sentence as mitigating. See infra Part III.B. In
many of those cases, though, that result is at least partly due to deferential review of state death
penalty cases on habeas corpus review. See infra Part III.B.
161. See, e.g., State v. Bearup, 211 P.3d 684, 694–95 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc); State v. Schurz,
859 P.2d 156, 167 (Ariz. 1993) (en banc).
162. See, e.g., Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 260 n.8 (Colo. 2003) (en banc) (noting the panel
considered the mitigating factor of the codefendant’s life sentence).
163. See, e.g., Garden v. State, 844 A.2d 311, 317 (Del. 2004) (agreeing that a codefendant’s
life sentence has long been viewed as a relevant sentencing factor), superseded on other grounds
by statute, 74 Del. Laws 174 (2003), as recognized in Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 759 (Del.
2005); State v. Ferguson, 642 A.2d 1267, 1267–68 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that a
codefendant’s sentence is a mitigating circumstance that is admissible at a sentencing hearing);
see also Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 433–34 (Del. 2016) (finding Delaware’s death penalty
unconstitutional).
164. Florida trial and appellate courts often consider comparable codefendant sentences in
capital cases as part of proportionality review. See, e.g., Jeffries v. State, 222 So. 3d 538, 548 (Fla.
2017) (finding that trial court applied the correct law regarding relative culpability of
codefendants); Sexton v. State, 775 So. 2d 923, 935–36 (Fla. 2000) (“Florida case law is clear—
a defendant may not be sentenced to death if a more culpable co-defendant has been sentenced to
life imprisonment or less. This reasoning probably also extends to equally culpable codefendants.”), denial of post-conviction relief aff’d, 997 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 2008). Because of the
state’s concern about proportionality in capital cases, courts sometimes extend that concern and
cite those cases in weighing whether to allow juries to consider codefendant sentences as a
mitigating factor. See Gonzalez v. State, 136 So. 3d 1125, 1165 (Fla. 2014) (concluding that
because the trial court found that the defendant’s death sentence was not disproportional to that
of his codefendants, “[t]he trial court committed no error in rejecting the disparate sentences of
the codefendants as a mitigating circumstance”), denial of post-conviction relief aff’d, 253 So. 3d
526 (Fla. 2018); see also Messer v. State, 330 So. 2d 137, 141–42 (Fla. 1976) (holding that a
sentencing jury was entitled to know that the codefendant negotiated a plea to second degree
murder and was sentenced to thirty years in prison); Slater v. State, 316 So. 2d 539, 542 (Fla.
1975) (finding that under Furman v. Georgia, the disparity between the death sentence for the
accomplice defendant and a life in prison sentence for the “triggerman” was not equal justice
under the law).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 4 [], Art. 3

1040

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

Illinois,165 Kansas,166 Maryland,167 and Ohio.168 Some jurisdictions
specifically mention this mitigating factor in their capital sentencing
statutes. For example, the federal death penalty statute allows
consideration of the codefendant factor.169 Similarly, New Hampshire’s
death penalty statute offers the following mitigating factor: “Another
defendant or defendants, equally culpable in the crime, will not be
punished by death.”170 Legislators in these jurisdictions have determined
that the information is relevant and included the mitigating factor as a
policy choice, whether or not there is a constitutional mandate for the
factor.
Many state courts have stressed the relevance of the sentence of an
equally culpable codefendant for sentencing a capital defendant.171 As
noted earlier, jurisdictions can require consideration of a codefendant’s
sentence as a mitigating factor by statute or under the state constitution.172

165. See, e.g., People v. Gleckler, 411 N.E.2d 849, 858–61 (Ill. 1980) (vacating a sentence
of death based in part upon an accomplice’s life sentence). Illinois, however, abolished the death
penalty in 2011. See Kevin M. Barry, The Law of Abolition, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 521,
530 (2017).
166. State v. Deiterman, 29 P.3d 411, 423 (Kan. 2001) (considering the mitigating factor of
the sentences of coconspirators).
167. See, e.g., Bryant v. State, 824 A.2d 60, 78 (Md. 2003) (“[T]he sentencing authority has
broad discretion to consider the disproportionate sentence of a co-defendant . . . but there is no
legislative requirement it do so.”); Johnson v. State, 495 A.2d 1, 17 (Md. 1985) (stating that a jury
is given broad discretion to conclude that a codefendant’s sentence is a mitigating factor or to
disregard the information).
168. See, e.g., State v. Dean, 54 N.E.3d 80, 146 (Ohio 2015) (noting that a codefendant’s
lesser sentence should be considered as a nonstatutory mitigating factor but finding in that case
the factor did not deserve significant weight); State v. Getsy, 702 N.E.2d 866, 892 (Ohio 1998)
(finding command for the treatment of a codefendant’s sentence as mitigating in Supreme Court
precedent), dismissal of post-conviction relief aff’d, No. 98-T-0140, 1999 WL 1073682 (Ohio Ct.
App. Oct. 22, 1999), denial of habeas corpus aff’d sub nom. Getsy v. Mitchell, 495 F.3d 295 (6th
Cir. 2007).
169. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(4) (2012) (requiring the jury to consider as a mitigating factor
that “[a]nother defendant or defendants, equally culpable in the crime, will not be punished by
death”); see also 21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(8) (2000) (repealed 2006) (“Another defendant or
defendants, equally culpable in the crime, will not be punished by death.”); United States v.
Simoy, 50 M.J. 1, 3 (C.A.A.F. 1998) (Sullivan, J., concurring) (reasoning in part based on the
Federal Death Penalty Act that the trial court erred in not allowing evidence of a codefendant’s
sentence); id. (Gierke, J., concurring) (concluding the same with similar reasoning to Judge
Sullivan’s).
170. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VI)(g) (2018).
171. See, e.g., Lowery v. State, 547 N.E.2d 1046, 1059 (Ind. 1989); State v. Clark, 990 P.2d
793, 806 (N.M. 1999).
172. Similarly, the Alabama Supreme Court has relied upon a state statute requiring death
sentences not be excessive or disproportionate to the punishment in similar cases to hold that a
trial court did not give proper mitigating weight to the fact that the defendant was the only one of
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Regarding statutes, the circumstance may be listed specifically, or courts
may find it as part of interpreting a catchall provision in the state’s death
penalty statute.173 Some jurisdictions provide for appellate courts to
consider a codefendant’s sentence as part of a proportionality review.174
And in other jurisdictions, a codefendant’s sentence may be considered
both by a jury as a mitigating factor at trial and during appellate
proportionality review.175 The open question, though, is whether, in
jurisdictions without statutes requiring that a codefendant’s sentence be
considered as a mitigating factor, the United States Constitution requires
jurors to weigh the factor.
The highest courts in Arizona, Delaware, and Florida have concluded
that the life sentence of an equally culpable codefendant is relevant as
mitigating evidence for a jury to consider.176 For example, the Arizona
six participants in the crime who was prosecuted. Ex parte Burgess, 811 So. 2d 617, 628 (Ala.
2010) (citing ALA. CODE § 13A-5-53(b)(3) (2010)).
173. See State v. Green, 609 N.E.2d 1253, 1263 (Ohio 1993) (concluding that a
codefendant’s sentence should be considered under the catchall section of state’s statute); see also
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(9) (2018) (“Any other circumstance arising from the evidence
which the jury deems to have mitigating value.”); Flanagan v. State, 810 P.2d 759, 762 (Nev.
1991) (holding that the prosecutor’s introduction of information about the sentences of
codefendants was admissible under a statute allowing “any other matter which the court deems
relevant” (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.552 (1991))), vacated, 503 U.S. 931 (1992), and
vacated sub nom. Moore v. Nevada, 503 U.S. 930 (1992); State v. Roseboro, 528 S.E.2d 1, 8
(N.C. 2000) (stating that although a codefendant’s sentence is not relevant to the defendant’s
character or the circumstances of the crime, an accomplice’s sentence may still be considered as
a mitigating circumstance under the state statute’s catchall mitigating factor provision); cf. State
v. Smith, 532 S.E.2d 773, 793–94 (N.C. 2000) (citing State v. Williams, 292 S.E.2d 243, 261–62
(N.C. 1982)) (holding that an accomplice’s punishment is not part of the defendant’s character
nor a mitigating factor).
174. See, e.g., McWhorter v. State, 781 So. 2d 257, 329 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (considering
a codefendant’s sentence during proportionality review), aff’d sub nom. Ex parte McWhorter, 781
So. 2d 330 (Ala. 2000), denial of post-conviction relief aff’d, 142 So. 3d 1195 (Ala. Crim. App.
2011); State v. Stokes, 352 S.E.2d 653, 667 (N.C. 1987) (considering a codefendant’s life sentence
during proportionality review).
175. See, e.g., Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997, 1026 (Del. 1985) (noting, while conducting
proportionality review, that a codefendant’s sentence was also submitted as a mitigating factor);
Ray v. State, 755 So. 2d 604, 611–12 (Fla. 2000) (holding that a defendant’s sentence was
disproportionate when a codefendant received a life sentence).
176. See, e.g., Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415, 419 n.4 (Fla. 1990) (stating that trial courts
should consider the mitigating factor of disparate treatment of similar codefendants), abrogated
by Trease v. State 768 So.2d 1050 (Fla. 2000). Also, in Messer v. State, the trial court had allowed
a sentencing jury to know that a codefendant was sentenced to thirty years in prison even though
the codefendant had negotiated a plea. Messer v. State, 403 So. 2d 341, 347 (Fla. 1981); see also
Slater v. State, 316 So. 2d 539, 542 (Fla. 1975) (overruling a death sentence and holding that a
codefendant’s sentence was a mitigating factor even though the codefendant had pleaded nolo
contendere). In Florida, the state’s statute does not specifically list a codefendant’s sentence as a
mitigating factor, although the statute contains the mitigating factor that “[t]he defendant was an
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Supreme Court, in State v. Marlow,177 weighed a codefendant’s sentence
in changing a defendant’s sentence from death to life in prison.178 The
court found that the “dramatic disparity” between the defendant’s death
sentence and his codefendant’s four-year prison sentence was a
mitigating factor that the trial court failed to consider.179 The court further
explained that even though the codefendant had accepted a plea deal,
because both defendants were originally charged with murder in the first
degree, “[i]t makes no difference whether the dramatic disparity in
sentences created by the prosecutor’s plea offer resulted from tactical
considerations at trial or from who won the race to the prosecutor’s
door.”180
Courts have found the sentencing disparity as a mitigating factor in
other cases where the codefendant pleaded guilty and did not go to trial.
For example, in State v. Cabrera,181 a Delaware Superior Court
recognized that a codefendant had received a lighter sentence as the result
of a plea bargain for assisting the State in its case against the defendant.182
But the court, noting that the codefendant’s involvement in the crime was
still significant, reasoned that the capital defendant could still use the
sentence disparity as mitigating evidence.183
accomplice in the capital felony committed by another person and his or her participation was
relatively minor.” FLA. STAT. § 921.141(7)(d) (2018).
177. 786 P.2d 395 (Ariz. 1989) (en banc).
178. Id. at 402. While Arizona is among the jurisdictions that have required consideration of
this mitigating factor, in other ways Arizona has generally been restrictive on mitigating factors.
Arizona courts held for fifteen years that defendants had to show a causal nexus between
mitigating factor and crime. McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798, 803 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). In
2015, in McKinney v. Ryan, the Ninth Circuit held this practice was unconstitutional. See id. at
803–05 (holding that the Arizona Supreme Court applied a causal nexus rule to mitigating
evidence contrary to Eddings v. Oklahoma in a number of cases); see also Styers v. Ryan, 811
F.3d 292, 298–99 (9th Cir. 2015) (discussing the procedures for the Arizona Supreme Court to
review cases with claims based upon McKinney v. Ryan).
179. Marlow, 786 P.2d at 401–02. Arizona’s death penalty sentencing statute does not
specifically list a codefendant’s sentence as a mitigating factor, so the basis for the court decisions
requiring it must be from the U.S. Constitution, the Arizona constitution, or both. See ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-751(G) (2018).
180. Marlow, 786 P.2d at 402.
181. No. 9703012700, 1999 WL 41630 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 21, 1999), aff’d on other
grounds, 747 A.2d 543 (Del. 2000).
182. Cabrera, 1999 WL 41630, at *11. In 2016, the Supreme Court of Delaware held that
the state’s death penalty statute violated the U.S. Constitution because it allowed a judge instead
of a unanimous jury to find aggravating circumstances. See Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 433 (Del.
2016).
183. Cabrera, 1999 WL 41630, at *11. The codefendant held the elderly victim as the
defendant worked to smother the victim. Id. at *10–11. Additionally, the codefendant helped
dispose of the body. Id. at *11. Although the codefendant was remorseful and had testified against
the defendant, the court considered the fact that the codefendant “was permitted to plea to Second
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If a capital defendant has the sentence disparity mitigating factor, it
does not automatically mean that the defendant will receive a life
sentence. Courts that evaluate the mitigating circumstance often weigh
the relative culpabilities of the capital defendant and the codefendant to
assess whether their involvement in the murder justifies a disparate
sentence.184 In these cases, courts often perform significant analyses
comparing the culpability of the defendant and the codefendant. In State
v. Bearup,185 the Arizona Supreme Court reasoned that codefendants’
sentences were mitigating, but in that case the factor only carried limited
weight because the disparity in the sentences resulted from the fact that
the codefendants made plea bargains, and also because the defendant had
additional aggravating factors.186
In Bearup, the court first discussed the importance of whether the
disparity in sentences can be explained. It stressed, “A disparity in
sentences between codefendants and/or accomplices can be a mitigating
circumstance if no reasonable explanation exists for the disparity.”187
Therefore, “[o]nly the unexplained disparity is significant.”188 The court
added, though, that “even [an] unexplained disparity has little
significance” in some cases where a jury finds the aggravating
circumstance that the murder was “especially cruel, heinous or
depraved.”189
Degree Murder as a mitigating circumstance.” Id. at *10–11. As in Arizona, in Delaware the
existence of the mitigating factor is not based on a state statute listing the mitigating circumstance.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (2019), invalidated by Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del.
2016). Note, however, that the Delaware Supreme Court subsequently found Delaware’s death
penalty unconstitutional for reasons unrelated to this mitigating factor. See Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d
430, 433–34 (Del. 2016) (finding Delaware’s death penalty unconstitutional).
184. See Marlow, 786 P.2d at 402; State v. Gerlaugh, 659 P.2d 642, 644 (Ariz. 1983)
(Cameron, J., concurring); see also Arthur v. State, 711 So. 2d 1031, 1096–97 (Ala. Crim. App.
1996) (holding that the disparity of treatment between the appellant and his accomplices was a
nonstatutory mitigating circumstance), aff’d sub nom. Ex parte Arthur, 711 So. 2d 1097 (Ala.
1997).
185. 211 P.3d 684 (Ariz. 2009).
186. Id. at 695–96. Although Bearup and other Arizona cases hold that a codefendant’s
sentence may constitute a mitigating circumstance in some situations, some earlier Arizona cases
stressed the importance of such evidence for proportionality purposes. See id.; see, e.g., State v.
Lambright, 673 P.2d 1, 15 (Ariz. 1983) (“We must remind prosecuting attorneys that the favorable
treatment accorded to an accomplice can, under different facts, be given weight in considering the
proportionality of a capital sentence.”), overruled on other grounds by Hedlund v. Sheldon, 840
P.2d 1008 (Ariz. 1992).
187. Bearup, 211 P.3d at 695 (quoting State v. Kayer, 984 P.2d 31, 47 (Ariz. 1999)).
188. Id. (quoting State v. Ellison, 140 P.3d 899, 923 (Ariz. 2006)).
189. Id. (quoting Ellison, 140 P.3d at 923); see also Lambright, 673 P.2d at 13–14 (affirming
a defendant’s death sentence because of the cruel, heinous and depraved nature of the defendant’s
offense outweighed the mitigating factors presented by the defendant, including the immunity
granted to an accomplice); Gerlaugh, 659 P.2d at 644 (Cameron, J., concurring) (holding that the
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In its analysis, the Arizona Supreme Court then proceeded to compare
Bearup’s facts to other cases involving sentencing disparities.190 It
concluded that the mitigating circumstance should carry only limited
weight “in light of the reasonable explanations for the disparity,” which
included that the defendant had an extensive criminal history, the
defendant was older than the nineteen-year-old codefendant, the
codefendant had a “more limited role in the crimes,” and the
codefendant’s testimony helped the case against the defendant.191
Jurisdictions that hold that a codefendant’s prison sentence may be
mitigating often do not discuss why such evidence is mitigating or why
the U.S. Constitution requires consideration of the specific mitigating
circumstance.192 Generally, at most, a court may briefly find support for
the conclusion that a codefendant’s sentence is a nonstatutory mitigating
factor based on implications from Supreme Court precedent.193 But even
if courts do not delve into the reasoning for the legal principle, they often
do extensive analysis of the facts, as in the Bearup case, comparing the
culpability of the defendants and codefendants, while also considering
other reasons that might justify the disparity.194 Thus, in these cases, the
different sentences of a defendant and an accomplice were proportionate in light of the
accomplice’s mitigating circumstances and the defendant’s aggravating circumstances). Although
the Bearup court noted that an “unexplained disparity [may have] little significance” in cases
where “the murder [was] especially cruel, heinous, or depraved,” the court proceeded to discuss
its decision in Marlow, a case where a “dramatic disparity in sentences [was] sufficient to require
reduction” of a death sentence to a life sentence despite the aggravating circumstances of the
defendant’s offense. Bearup, 211 P.3d at 695 (quoting Ellison, 140 P.3d at 923) (citing Marlow,
786 P.2d at 402).
190. Bearup, 211 P.3d at 695–96.
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., State v. White, 982 P.2d 819, 827 (Ariz. 1999) (“Unexplained disparity
between the sentences of a defendant and codefendant may be a mitigating factor in a capital
case.”); State v. Schurz, 859 P.2d 156, 167 (Ariz. 1993) (“This court has on occasion considered
as a mitigating factor the disparity between the sentence of a defendant sentenced to death and a
codefendant or accomplice sentenced to some term of imprisonment.”); Heath v. State, 648 So.
2d 660, 665–66 (Fla. 1994) (explaining how a sentencing court balanced the relative culpability
of a defendant and a codefendant); Williams v. State, 622 So. 2d 456, 464, 465 (Fla. 1993)
(upholding the trial judge’s override of the jury’s recommendation of a life sentence, in part
because a disparity in a codefendant’s sentence in the case would not justify a life sentence for
the defendant).
193. For example, the Supreme Court of Ohio found that “[i]n Parker v. Dugger, the United
States Supreme Court implicitly recognized that a codefendant’s sentence could be considered a
nonstatutory mitigating factor.” State v. Getsy, 702 N.E.2d 866, 892 (Ohio 1998) (citation
omitted) (citing Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991)).
194. See Bearup, 211 P.3d at 695–96; see also State v. Lynch, 357 P.3d 119, 142 (Ariz.
2015) (finding that where the defendant “was the killer, and [the codefendant] received a life
sentence as a result of a plea agreement,” the “[s]entencing disparity [was] not a mitigating
circumstance”), rev’d on other grounds, Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016); State v.
Carlson, 48 P.3d 1180, 1197, 1198 (Ariz. 2002) (finding that a sentencing disparity was mitigating
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information regarding the mitigating factor provides jurors with detailed
insight into the case and the defendants.
B. Jurisdictions Holding that a Codefendant’s Sentence Is Not
Mitigating Evidence
By contrast, several jurisdictions have held that the U.S. Constitution
does not require sentencing juries to weigh a codefendant’s sentence as a
mitigating factor.195 In these decisions, courts generally base their
conclusion on one reason. They rely upon the Supreme Court language
defining a mitigating factor as an aspect of the defendant’s character or
record or any of the circumstances of the offense.196 From that definition,
these courts then conclude that the codefendant factor does not fit within
any of those categories.
Federal courts from the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits
generally have found that the Eighth Amendment does not mandate that
a capital defendant may introduce evidence of a codefendant’s sentence
as mitigating.197 But recent federal decisions reviewing state court
where the defendant who hired the killer was sentenced to death and the actual killer received a
life sentence).
195. See, e.g., State v. Koskovich, 776 A.2d 144, 202–03, 204 (N.J. 2001) (holding that “the
trial court correctly chose not to instruct the jury about [a codefendant’s] sentence as an
independent mitigating factor under [New Jersey’s death penalty statute]” and upholding the
constitutionality of that statute “under the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution”
(quoting State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1987))); State v. Brown, 651 A.2d 19, 55, 56 (N.J.
1994) (rejecting a defendant’s claim that a sentencing jury should be allowed to consider an
accomplice’s sentence as a mitigating factor and holding that such consideration is not required
under the U.S. Constitution), overruled on other grounds by State v. Cooper, 700 A.2d 306, 331
(N.J. 1997); State v. Smith, 532 S.E.2d 773, 793–94 (N.C. 2000) (holding that a trial court
properly barred the jury from considering a codefendant’s sentence because an “accomplice[’s]
punishment is not an aspect of the defendant’s character . . . nor a mitigating circumstance of the
particular offense” (quoting State v. Williams, 292 S.E.2d 243, 261–62 (N.C. 1982))); State v.
Berry, 650 N.E.2d 433, 443 (Ohio 1995) (rejecting, without explanation, an appellant’s argument
that an accomplice’s life sentence should be considered as mitigation); Commonwealth v. Frey,
554 A.2d 27, 33 (Pa. 1989) (“The sentence received by a co-conspirator [was] not a mitigating
circumstance . . . .”); State v. Charping, 508 S.E.2d 851, 856 (S.C. 1998) (“The trial court properly
excluded evidence of [a codefendant’s] convictions and sentence.”); cf. State v. Henley, 774
S.W.2d 908, 918 (Tenn. 1989) (citing State v. Carter, 714 S.W.2d 241, 251 (Tenn. 1986)) (holding
that a rational basis for a sentencing disparity existed when a codefendant received a lesser penalty
than the defendant because the codefendant did not initiate the crimes and participated out of fear
for his life).
196. See, e.g., Brown, 651 A.2d at 55.
197. See, e.g., Meyer v. Branker, 506 F.3d 358, 375 (4th Cir. 2007); Beardslee v. Woodford,
358 F.3d 560, 579 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Although a trial court is not necessarily precluded from
allowing consideration of co-defendant sentences, a trial court does not commit constitutional
error under Lockett by refusing to allow such evidence.”); Schneider v. Delo, 85 F.3d 335, 342
(8th Cir. 1996) (agreeing with the Missouri Supreme Court’s holding that the codefendant’s thirty-
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decisions apply a deferential federal habeas corpus standard of review
under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996198
(AEDPA).199 Thus, under AEDPA, a federal habeas court may only issue
the writ in cases “where there is no possibility fair-minded jurists could
disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with [the Supreme
Court’s] precedents.”200
Because of the deferential review standard, federal courts therefore
generally do not reverse a state decision precluding the admission of a
codefendant’s sentence. Still, several federal courts have stated that the
codefendant factor does not appear to meet the definition of relevant
mitigating evidence. For example, in Meyer v. Branker,201 the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld a North Carolina Supreme Court
decision preventing a defendant from introducing his codefendant’s
sentence into evidence.202 The Court of Appeals reasoned, “Since a coperpetrator’s sentence is neither an aspect of the defendant’s character or
record nor a circumstance of the offense, . . . it is within ‘the traditional
authority of a court to exclude’ such evidence as ‘irrelevant’” under
Lockett.203 The court explained that it was holding only that the U.S.
Constitution did not require the admission of such evidence and that
states were at liberty to adopt their own guidelines requiring the factor.204

year prison term “had nothing to do with [the defendant’s] ‘character or record’ or with the
‘circumstances of the offense’” (quoting State v. Schneider, 736 S.W.2d 392, 395–97 (Mo.
1987))); Brogdon v. Blackburn, 790 F.2d 1164, 1169 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that a codefendant’s
life sentence is not a relevant mitigating factor). But see Morris v. U.S. District Court, 363 F.3d
891, 897 (9th Cir. 2004) (Ferguson, J., concurring specially) (noting an exception to allow for
consideration of a codefendant’s sentence as a mitigating factor where the prosecutor concedes
that a harsher penalty was selected for the defendant while also conceding that the codefendant
was equally as guilty).
198. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012)).
199. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102, 113 (2016). Federal
habeas corpus courts applying pre-AEDPA law reviewed legal questions and mixed questions of
law and fact with a de novo standard of review. See, e.g., JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, 2
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 30.2, at 956–57 (2d ed. 1994); Chris
Hutton, The “New” Federal Habeas: Implications for State Standards of Review, 40 S.D. L. REV.
442, 463 (1995); Note, Rewriting the Great Writ: Standards of Review for Habeas Corpus Under
the New 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1868, 1869–70 (1997). See generally Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (applying the same standard of review in habeas corpus to state
court decisions of mixed question of law and fact and of questions of law).
200. Postelle v. Royal, No. CIV-12-1110-F, 2016 WL 4597629, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 2,
2016) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102), aff’d sub
nom. Postelle v. Carpenter, 901 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2018).
201. 506 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2007).
202. Id. at 375.
203. Id. (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 n.12 (1978)).
204. Id. at 375–76.
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Similarly, in a pre-AEDPA case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Brogdon v. Blackburn205 reasoned that a codefendant’s
life sentence was not relevant to the defendant’s “character, prior record,
or the circumstances of his offense.”206 The Brogdon court did note,
however, that the codefendant’s life sentence was relevant to an analysis
of the proportionality of the defendant’s sentence compared to the
sentences of others, an analysis required by state statute in Louisiana.207
Following the Fifth Circuit precedent, the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Texas in Cordova v. Johnson208 also concluded that a
codefendant’s life sentence was not “constitutionally relevant mitigating
evidence” because it did not relate to the defendant’s “character or
background or the circumstances of the crime.”209 The court, however,
laid out a questionable restrained view of mitigating evidence, limiting it
to “evidence that establishes (1) the defendant suffered from a uniquely
severe permanent handicap with which the defendant is burdened through
no fault of his own and (2) the defendant’s criminal act was attributable
to this severe permanent condition.”210 Considering a codefendant’s
sentence, the court reasoned that “[t]he happenstance that a different
sentencing authority, or . . . a different prosecutor, chose to display mercy
toward [a codefendant] based on the peculiarities of [the codefendant’s]
own character, background, record, and role in the offense, bears no
relevance to the propriety of the petitioner’s sentence.”211
Recently, the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma
reported in Postelle v. Royal212 that most federal cases “indicate that a
trial court does not violate Lockett or any other clearly established federal
law by excluding evidence of a co-defendant’s sentence.”213 Thus,
205. 790 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1986).
206. Id. at 1169 (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 n.7).
207. Id.
208. 993 F. Supp. 473 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
209. Id. at 502–03.
210. Id. at 502.
211. Id.; see also McGehee v. Norris, No. 5:03-CV-143JMM, 2008 WL 11450875, at *1
(E.D. Ark. Feb. 28, 2008) (concluding that evidence of a codefendant’s lesser sentence was not a
mitigating factor because it did not go toward the defendant’s character or culpability).
212. Postelle v. Royal, No. CIV-12-1110-F, 2016 WL 4597629 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 2, 2016),
aff’d sub nom. Postelle v. Carpenter, 901 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2018).
213. Id. at *19. In Postelle, the district court noted that it could not find any published Tenth
Circuit decisions on the issue of whether Lockett requires admission of a codefendant’s sentence,
although decisions from the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits found that Lockett does not require
admission of such evidence. Id. The Postelle court reasoned that the decisions from those circuits
were consistent with Lockett’s definition of mitigation regarding a defendant’s character or record
or the circumstances of the crime because a codefendant’s sentence “is an extrinsic
consideration.” Id. Ultimately, applying the deferential habeas corpus standard of review, the
Postelle court found that the state court did not err by excluding evidence of the codefendant’s
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applying AEDPA’s deferential standard of review, the district court
found that the state court’s decision to preclude such evidence “was not
contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal
law.”214 Affirming that decision on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit recognized that “a legitimate controversy regarding the
relevance of a codefendant’s sentence . . . indicates the Lockett line of
cases does not answer the question.”215 But, like the lower court, the court
of appeals upheld the state court’s exclusion of the mitigating factor
under the federal habeas corpus deferential standard of review.216
Although recent federal court decisions provide limited insight into
the issue because of the habeas standard of review,217 several state courts
have concluded, on the merits, that the U.S. Constitution does not require
a court to permit a jury to consider a codefendant’s sentence as mitigating
evidence.218 For example, in the California case of People v. Dyer,219 the
defendant wanted to introduce, during his penalty phase, evidence of the
sentence because it was “not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law.” Id.
214. Id. The district court explained, “This conclusion is consistent with Lockett’s direction
to allow mitigating evidence about a defendant’s character, record, or the circumstances of the
crime. A co-defendant’s sentence does not fall into any of those categories. Instead, it is an
extrinsic consideration.” Id.
215. Carpenter, 901 F.3d at 1223.
216. Id.
217. Additionally, the constitutional issue does not arise in federal death penalty trials
because the federal death penalty statute expressly allows the mitigating circumstance. See 18
U.S.C. § 3592 (a)(4) (2012) (requiring the jury to consider as a mitigating factor that “[a]nother
defendant or defendants, equally culpable in the crime, will not be punished by death”).
218. See, e.g., Simpson v. State, 6 S.W.3d 104, 108–09 (Ark. 1999); Crowder v. State, 491
S.E.2d 323, 325 (Ga. 1997) (“[W]e are not persuaded at this time that a certified copy of a codefendant’s life sentence is a mitigating circumstance for the jury to consider.”); Edwards v. State,
200 S.W.3d 500, 510–11 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (holding that appellate counsel was not ineffective
for arguing a codefendant’s life sentence was mitigating evidence because case law indicated the
defendant did not have a constitutional right to present such evidence); Commonwealth v.
Williams, 896 A.2d 523, 547 (Pa. 2006) (holding that a codefendant’s sentence does not fall into
the state’s definition of mitigating evidence); State v. Charping, 508 S.E.2d 851, 855 (S.C. 1998)
(holding that a codefendant’s life sentence was not relevant to the circumstances of the crime and
therefore the court was not required to admit the evidence as mitigating); Joubert v. State, 235
S.W.3d 729, 734 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (holding that evidence related to a codefendant’s
punishment is not a mitigating circumstance that a defendant has a constitutional right to present).
Some of these states, however, do allow consideration of a codefendant’s sentence during
proportionality review. See, e.g., State v. Gilmore, 681 S.W.2d 934, 946–47 (Mo. 1984) (en banc)
(considering a codefendant’s sentence during proportionality review); Commonwealth v. Zook,
615 A.2d 1, 18 (Pa. 1992) (noting that information about codefendants is to be considered for
proportionality review); Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 464 S.E.2d 131, 138 (Va. 1995) (holding
that the court was not required to compare a defendant’s sentence to a codefendant’s sentence as
part of proportionality review).
219. 753 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1988) (en banc).
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non-death sentences imposed in separate trials of two other participants
in the murder.220 After the trial court ruled that such evidence was
irrelevant, the Supreme Court of California agreed.221
The Dyer court noted U.S. Supreme Court precedent that
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the
sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any
aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death.222
The court reasoned that the codefendant evidence did not relate to these
aspects of the defendant or to the circumstances of the offense.223
Additionally, the court explained that the jury would not know the
evidence submitted in the other cases because they had separate trials:
“Such evidence provides nothing more than incomplete, extraneous, and
confusing information to a jury . . . .”224
California courts have continued to follow Dyer’s reasoning.225 In the
2011 case of People v. Moore,226 the Supreme Court of California noted
that other jurisdictions held to the contrary but reasserted, “We have
consistently held that evidence concerning coparticipants’ sentences is
properly excluded from the penalty phase of a capital trial because such
evidence is irrelevant.”227
220. Id. at 26.
221. Id. at 26–27.
222. Id. (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)). Similarly, the court noted that
under California law mitigating evidence includes evidence of a defendant’s characteristics, such
as background and mental condition. Id. at 26.
223. Id. at 27. Additionally, the court rejected the defendant’s “fairness” argument and
declined to adopt a proportionality review that would take into account the other defendants’
sentences. Id. at 27–28.
224. Id. at 27. The court’s conclusion that a jury would not be familiar with the evidence
submitted in a codefendant’s case is at odds with the practice of other courts; jurisdictions that
allow sentencing juries to consider a codefendant’s sentence allow those juries to compare the
mitigating and aggravating factors in the defendant’s case to the mitigating and aggravating
factors in the codefendant’s case. This would not be possible if the sentencing jury did not know
what evidence the codefendant’s jury had considered. See, e.g., State v. Bearup, 211 P.3d 684,
691 (Ariz. 2009).
225. See, e.g., People v. Salazar, 371 P.3d 161, 190 (Cal. 2016) (stating that evidence about
what a different jury found regarding a different defendant “provides nothing more than
incomplete, extraneous, and confusing information to a jury, which is then left to speculate”
(quoting People v. Benmore, 996 P.2d 1152 (Cal. 2000))).
226. 253 P.3d 1153 (Cal. 2011).
227. Id. at 1181 (citing People v. Brown, 73 P.3d 1137 (Cal. 2003)); People v. McDermott,
51 P.3d 874, 912 (Cal. 2002); People v. Beardslee, 806 P.2d 1311, 1335 (Cal. 1991); People v.
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A number of state courts have come to the same conclusion. For
example, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has concluded that a
codefendant’s punishment is not a mitigating factor because such
punishments relate “neither to appellant’s character, nor to his record, nor
to the circumstances of the offense.”228 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals similarly concluded that a codefendant’s sentence is not a
mitigating factor because it “has no bearing on the defendant’s character
or record and is not a circumstance of the offense.”229
In jurisdictions that perform some sort of proportionality review,
courts have reasoned that evidence about a codefendant’s sentence is
better considered by appellate courts for that type of review rather than
by juries as a mitigating circumstance.230 In Edwards v. State,231 the
Missouri Supreme Court concluded that the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Parker v. Dugger on proportionality review does not mandate
that a codefendant’s sentence be admitted as mitigating evidence.232

Johnson, 767 P.2d 1047, 1075–76 (Cal. 1989), overruled by People v. Gutierrez, 395 P.3d 186
(Cal. 2017). The court recognized that 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(4) provides for the contrary and also
that Florida courts held to the contrary. Moore, 253 P.3d at 1181.
228. Joubert v. State, 235 S.W.3d 729, 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Morris v. State,
940 S.W.2d 610, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)); see also State v. Williams, 292 S.E.2d 243, 261–
62 (N.C. 1982) (“[An accomplice’s] punishment is not an aspect of the defendant’s character or
record nor a mitigating circumstance of the particular offense.”); State v. Hughes, 521 S.E.2d 500,
505 (S.C. 1999) (holding that a codefendant’s sentence is not a mitigating circumstance because
it is not relevant to the defendant’s character, the defendant’s record, or the circumstances of the
offense); Saldano v. State, 232 S.W.3d 77, 100 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (finding that evidence of
a codefendant’s punishment is not mitigating evidence that a defendant has a constitutional right
to present because such evidence does not relate to the defendant’s own circumstances); Morris,
940 S.W.2d at 614 (“We do not see how the conviction and punishment of a co-defendant could
mitigate appellant’s culpability in the crime.” (quoting Evans v. State, 656 S.W.2d 65, 67 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1983))). Texas also does not perform comparative proportionality review, so its courts
do not consider a codefendant’s sentence at either stage. See McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482,
499 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), abrogated by Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Crim. App.
1988).
229. Wackerly v. State, 12 P.3d 1, 15 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000) (quoting Brogie v. State, 695
P.2d 538, 547 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985)). Also, in Postelle v. State, 267 P.3d 114 (Okla. Crim.
App. 2011), the court held that the trial court was correct in finding that the accomplice’s sentence
was not relevant and that the defendant was the more culpable party. Id. at 140–42. The court
reasoned that relevant mitigating evidence includes only evidence that relates to the defendant’s
personal circumstances or blameworthiness. Id.
230. But then, in states without such proportionality review, such evidence would never
otherwise be considered by the court. See supra Part IV.B.
231. 200 S.W.3d 500 (Mo. 2006) (en banc).
232. Id. at 510 (citing Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991)); see also Edwards v. Roper,
No. 4:06-CV-1419 (CEJ), 2009 WL 3164112, at *14 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 28, 2009) (finding, on
habeas review, that the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court was not contrary to or an
unreasonable application of Parker v. Dugger); cf. State v. McIlvoy, 629 S.W.2d 333, 341–42
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Similarly, in State v. Schneider,233 the Missouri Supreme Court stressed
that a request to submit a codefendant’s sentence as mitigating is actually
a request for a jury to conduct a proportionality review.234 The court
explained that the argument to consider such evidence as mitigating “is
flawed by its assumption that the jury may properly engage in a
proportionality review which takes into consideration sentences awarded
other defendants.”235 And the court concluded that such a task is assigned
by statute to the Missouri Supreme Court, not the jury.236
Similarly, the Mississippi Supreme Court has stressed that
proportionality review by an appellate court is the proper method for
considering a codefendant’s sentence.237 Therefore, in Mississippi, which
does have statutorily required proportionality review, the Mississippi
Supreme Court has considered codefendants’ sentences as a part of
proportionality review.238 Further, according to that court, the same
evidence is not mitigation to be considered by sentencing jurors because
such evidence does not relate to a defendant’s character, prior record, or
circumstances of the offense.239
Another court found a different way to admit such evidence. In State
v. Roseboro,240 the Supreme Court of North Carolina asserted that
evidence of a codefendant’s sentence is not a mitigating circumstance
under Supreme Court precedent because such evidence is “not relevant
to a defendant’s character or record or to the circumstances of the
killing.”241 But the court concluded that the evidence could still be
(Mo. 1982) (en banc) (finding a death sentence disproportionate to the crime because the
defendant was a follower of a codefendant who had received a life sentence).
233. 736 S.W.2d 392 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
234. Id. at 397.
235. Id.
236. Id.; see also McIlvoy, 629 S.W.2d at 341–42 (finding a death sentence disproportionate
to the crime because the defendant was a follower of a codefendant who had received a life
sentence).
237. See Stewart v. State, 662 So. 2d 552, 563 (Miss. 1995); Johnson v. State, 477 So. 2d
196, 218 (Miss. 1985).
238. See, e.g., Pitchford v. State, 45 So. 3d 216, 259–60 (Miss. 2010) (holding that a
defendant’s death sentence was not disproportional or excessive compared to a sixteen-year-old
accomplice’s lesser sentence in light of the circumstances of the crime); Jordan v. State, 918 So.
2d 636, 658–59 (Miss. 2005) (holding that the defendant’s death sentence was not
disproportionate when compared to other death penalty cases or when compared to his
codefendant’s sentence); Branch v. State, 882 So. 2d 36, 67 (Miss. 2004) (holding that a death
sentence was not excessive or disproportionate to a codefendant’s life sentence); Smith v. State,
877 So. 2d 369, 386–87 (Miss. 2004) (holding that a defendant’s death sentence was not
disproportionate to a codefendant’s lesser sentence due to the defendant’s role in the crime and
his criminal history).
239. See Stewart, 662 So. 2d at 562.
240. 528 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 2000).
241. Id. at 8.
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considered as mitigating evidence under the state’s “catchall” mitigating
circumstance provision in the state’s statute: “Any other circumstance
arising from the evidence which the jury deems to have mitigating
value.”242 Thus, the court found that such evidence meets the statutory
definition of “mitigating circumstances” but not the constitutional
definition, although it was unclear why and how the two differed.243 In
an unusual aspect of the case, the prosecution was the party raising the
evidence, and the court held that it was proper for the prosecution to
address the codefendant’s sentence while arguing in opposition to the
“catchall” mitigating circumstance.244
Finally, although most cases involving a codefendant’s sentence
feature a defendant wanting to use a codefendant’s prison sentence, in
Commonwealth v. Lesko245 the defendant sought to introduce mitigating
evidence that his codefendant was sentenced to death.246 The defendant
claimed that the codefendant’s death sentence supported the argument
that the codefendant was more culpable than the non-triggerman
defendant.247 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, stated that the
codefendant’s sentence was irrelevant to the jury’s task to weigh the
circumstances related to the defendant.248

242. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(9) (2018); see Roseboro, 528 S.E.2d at 8.
243. One might argue that the Roseboro court is splitting hairs to say that evidence of a
codefendant’s sentence is not “mitigating” under a constitutional definition while it is
“mitigating” in the way the general term is used in the statute. Subsequent cases in the state have
further distinguished the statutory “catchall” provision from the constitutional definition by
stating that the use of such evidence under the “catchall” provision limits it to cases “where
evidence of the co-defendant’s sentence is already before the court, such as where the codefendant testified at trial and evidence of a plea bargain was presented by way of impeachment.”
State v. Roache, 595 S.E.2d 381, 426 (N.C. 2004) (citing State v. Gregory, 459 S.E.2d 638, 667
(N.C. 1995)). In the Roache case, however, the court held that the defendant had waived the
mitigating factor argument on appeal. Id. at 426.
244. Roseboro, 528 S.E.2d at 8.
245. 15 A.3d 345 (Pa. 2011).
246. Id. at 398–99.
247. Id. at 398.
248. Id. at 399. Note, however, that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s statement about the
evidence was dicta in the post-conviction appeal because the court first found that the claim had
been waived. Id. at 398–99; see also Commonwealth v. Romero, 938 A.2d 362, 389–90 (Pa. 2007)
(“[E]ven the ‘catch-all’ mitigating circumstance would not encompass evidence of coconspirators’ sentences because such evidence has nothing to do with ‘the character and record of
the defendant’ or ‘the circumstances of his offense.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. Lopez, 854
A.2d 465, 470–71 (Pa. 2004))); Commonwealth v. Williams, 896 A.2d 523, 547 (Pa. 2006)
(rejecting the argument that codefendants’ criminal cases are relevant to mitigation for a
defendant); Commonwealth v. Haag, 562 A.2d 289, 298 (Pa. 1989) (stating that the outcome of
the cases against the codefendants had “no bearing” on the defendant’s sentence); Commonwealth
v. Frey, 554 A.2d 27, 33 (Pa. 1989) (“Sentencing is a highly individualized matter, and we have
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Jurisdictions that do not require courts to allow juries to consider
evidence regarding an accomplice’s sentence create a division across the
country. Some jurisdictions allow the mitigating factor, some do not, and
some conclude that the evidence is relevant as a part of appellate
proportionality review.
IV. WHY CAPITAL DEFENDANTS SHOULD HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO INTRODUCE A CODEFENDANT’S SENTENCE AS A
MITIGATING FACTOR
Although courts around the country are divided on the issue, the courts
that hold that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments requires trial courts
to allow juries to consider a codefendant’s sentence as mitigating are
correct for several reasons.249 First and foremost, the Supreme Court’s
broad treatment of mitigating factors, stressing the importance of
individualized sentencing, dictates that juries be able to consider this
mitigating factor.
Second, such a mitigating factor also is supported by the Supreme
Court’s discussion about the importance of proportionality and fairness.
Third, the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the policies supporting the
constitutionality of the death penalty are served by this mitigating factor.
Finally, courts that have denied defendants the right to submit a
codefendant’s sentence as mitigating evidence have read the Supreme
Court cases too narrowly.
A. A Codefendant’s Sentence Reflects on Both the Circumstances of the
Crime and the Character of the Defendant
The main point of contention between the jurisdictions that allow the
admission of a codefendant’s sentence as mitigating evidence and those
that do not is the question of whether such evidence fits within the
description of mitigating circumstances laid out by the U.S. Supreme
Court. One argument against a constitutional requirement that a sentencer
consider a codefendant’s sentence is that the Court has defined mitigating
factors as ones that reflect the “circumstances of the crime or the
character of the defendant.”250 One might argue, as some courts have
reasoned, that the sentence of another person has nothing to do with the
character of the defendant or the circumstances of the crime. Therefore,
they explain, such evidence does not help achieve the Constitution’s goal
of an individualized sentence for a capital defendant.
already ruled that the cases against [the codefendants] are not similar to [the defendant’s] case for
purposes of proportionality review.”).
249. Even without clarity on the constitutional issue, it would be good policy for states to
adopt this mitigating circumstance as a statutory factor for many of the reasons stated in this
Article.
250. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

37

Florida Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 4 [], Art. 3

1054

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

Thus, one argument against allowing a jury to consider the sentence
of a codefendant is that such information is about the codefendant and
does not really say anything about the character of the defendant.
Additionally, one might argue that the codefendant’s jury may have
determined that the defendant was more culpable and thus sentenced the
codefendant to a lesser sentence.
In reality, however, evaluating the sentence of a codefendant does
help the defendant’s jury evaluate both the character of the defendant and
the circumstances of the crime, especially the latter. The extent of the
codefendant’s involvement and the appropriate punishment for that
codefendant arguably convey information about the character of the
defendant. How the two codefendants interacted and the relative
culpability, as assessed by another jury, provide details about the
defendant.
Even more so than demonstrating character, though, a codefendant’s
sentence provides the jury with information about the circumstances of
the crime. If another jury has determined that a perpetrator of the exact
same crime deserves a sentence less than death, then the defendant’s jury
should weigh what that decision says about the circumstances of the
crime. Such information may mean more to a jury and tell a jury more
about the crime than a defendant’s adjustment to incarceration, which the
Supreme Court found to be a mitigating circumstance in Skipper v. South
Carolina.251
Additionally, Congress has indicated that it considers evidence of a
codefendant’s sentence as evidence fitting within a “defendant’s
background, record, or character or any other circumstance of the
offense.”252 The sentencing statute for the federal death penalty states:
“In determining whether a sentence of death is to be imposed on a
defendant, the finder of fact shall consider any mitigating factor,
including the following: . . . Another defendant or defendants, equally
culpable in the crime, will not be punished by death.”253 The statute’s
language includes a codefendant’s sentence as a “mitigating factor,”254
supporting reasoning that the factor fits within the constitutional
definition.
Of course, a statute may provide more mitigating factors than are
required by the Constitution. But the federal statute goes on to also
include a catchall provision: “Other factors in the defendant’s
251. 476 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1986).
252. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(8) (2012).
253. Id. § 3592(a)(4).
254. The six other specifically listed mitigating factors in addition to the sentences of equally
culpable codefendants include impaired capacity, duress, minor participation, no prior criminal
record, disturbance, and victim’s consent. Id. § 3592(a).
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background, record, or character or any other circumstance of the offense
that mitigate against imposition of the death sentence.”255 The catchall
provision, therefore, incorporates the definition of mitigating evidence
used by the Supreme Court’s constitutional analysis. And, importantly,
the phrasing of the language of this catchall provision indicates that the
specifically listed mitigating factors, including the codefendant’s
sentence, also fall into the constitutional definition of other factors within
“the defendant’s background, record, or character or any other
circumstance of the offense that mitigate against imposition of the death
sentence.”256 Although the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the U.S.
Constitution is not bound by Congress’s interpretation of the same
language, Congress’s assessment does provide guidance as a reasonable
interpretation.
Most importantly, the Supreme Court has long used broad language
to define mitigating evidence because the requirement for individualized
sentencing when a defendant’s life is at stake is an important
constitutional right. For example, in Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman,257 the
Court further “emphasized the severity of imposing a death sentence and
that ‘the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to consider any
relevant mitigating factor.’”258 In Payne v. Tennessee,259 the Court noted
that “virtually no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a
capital defendant may introduce concerning his own circumstances.”260
Similarly, in Skipper, the Court explained that even though
favorable inferences from [testimony about the
defendant’s adjustment to incarceration] . . . would not
relate specifically to [the defendant’s] culpability for the
crime[,] . . . there is no question but that such inferences
would be ‘mitigating’ in the sense that they might serve
‘as a basis for a sentence less than death.’261
The Court has noted that for a piece of mitigating evidence to be
admitted, it need not be overwhelmingly persuasive for a life sentence,
255. Id. § 3592(a)(8).
256. Id.
257. 550 U.S. 233 (2007).
258. Id. at 248 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982)).
259. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
260. Id. at 822–23 (addressing the admission of victim impact evidence by the prosecution);
see also Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 171 (2006) (stating that the Court has noted that “as a
requirement of individualized sentencing, a jury must have the opportunity to consider all
evidence relevant to mitigation”).
261. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1986) (citation omitted) (quoting Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)).
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and jurors must be allowed to consider evidence that might be relevant.
There is a “low threshold for relevance” regarding mitigating evidence in
capital cases.262 “Relevant mitigating evidence is evidence which tends
logically to prove or disprove some fact or circumstance which a factfinder could reasonably deem to have mitigating value.”263 A fact finder
could reasonably determine that the fact that a codefendant received a life
sentence tends to support the conclusion that a defendant should also be
sentenced to something less than death.264
Although the Court has stated that in the context of mitigating
circumstances, “the Eighth Amendment does not deprive the State of its
authority to set reasonable limits upon the evidence a defendant can
submit, and to control the manner in which it is submitted,”265 this
language reflects on how such evidence is considered. The Court’s
limiting language on mitigating factors permits lower courts to limit how
mitigating evidence is assessed. But the Court’s decisions otherwise have
shown the Justices are reluctant to allow limits on what factors are
actually mitigating.
262. Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 44 (2004) (quoting Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 285
(2004)) (noting that there is a low relevance threshold for mitigating factors); Tennard, 542 U.S.
at 284–85 (stating that the meaning of “relevance” is the same for mitigating evidence as in any
other context).
263. McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 440 (1990) (quoting State v. McKoy, 372
S.E.2d 12, 45 (N.C. 1988) (Exum, C.J., dissenting)); see also Tennard, 542 U.S. at 285 (“[A] State
cannot bar ‘the consideration of . . . evidence if the sentencer could reasonably find that it warrants
a sentence less than death.’” (alteration in original) (quoting McKoy, 494 U.S. at 441)). Note that
in Tennard, the issue related to the relevance of the defendant’s evidence of a low I.Q., not
whether the factor could be mitigating. Id. at 284.
264. By contrast, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma in Postelle v.
Royal precluded evidence of a codefendant’s sentence by rejecting the petitioner’s argument that
any evidence that gives some reason to impose a sentence less than death is constitutionally
required mitigating evidence. Postelle v. Royal, No. CIV-12-1110-F, 2016 WL 4597629, at *19
(W.D. Okla. Sept. 2, 2016), aff’d sub nom. Postelle v. Carpenter, 901 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2018).
The court countered that it could think of a number of facts that might give “some reason” not to
impose the death penalty, “[b]ut many of those facts would be completely irrelevant to the actual
case that the jury must resolve.” Id. Similarly, in United States v. Gabrion, 719 F.3d 511 (6th Cir.
2013), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit contemplated that a broad reading of the Supreme
Court’s language on mitigating factors “would compel admission of evidence regarding the
positions of the planets and moons at the time of the defendant’s offense—so long as he can show
that at least one juror is a firm believer in astrology.” Id. at 522. The argument in this Article,
however, is not that anything that “might” give a reason for a lesser sentence is mitigating. Instead,
there is a reasonableness element to the definition of mitigating evidence in that it must be
something that a factfinder could reasonably determine has mitigating value. See McKoy, 494
U.S. at 440.
265. Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517, 526 (2006). The Court’s discussion in that case was
about the power of a state to “structure and shape consideration of mitigating evidence.” Id.
(quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377 (1990)); see also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S.
350, 362 (1993).
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Thus, in light of the Court’s language about the importance of
mitigation as well as the low standard for relevance, logic dictates that a
codefendant’s sentence fits within the definition of constitutionally
required mitigating evidence. A number of case decisions, as well as
Congress’s understanding of the constitutional requirement for mitigating
evidence, support this conclusion.
B. The Supreme Court’s Concerns About Fairness and Proportionality
Support that a Codefendant’s Sentence Should Be a Mitigating Factor
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has long been concerned that
the death penalty be applied fairly.266 While it has not mandated
proportionality review, the Court has noted that such analysis might be
an issue if cases with death sentences are not distinguished from cases
with lesser sentences.267 This fairness and proportionality concern
supports allowing juries to consider a codefendant’s sentence as a
mitigating factor.268 In many situations, no case will be more comparable
than the case of an accomplice to the same murder.
Some jurisdictions, though, use the proportionality argument to argue
against allowing codefendants’ sentences to be used as a mitigating
factor. These courts conclude that the codefendant’s sentence is better
weighed by an appellate court as part of proportionality review than by a
jury during sentencing.269 They reason that the amount of evaluation
required to compare different defendants is better done by an appellate
court.
There is some appeal to the argument that the comparison of cases is
complicated and better left to the appellate courts. But these cases in
jurisdictions that require such proportionality review by state statute
ignore that not all states require such a proportionality review. The
mitigating circumstance question instead focuses on whether the Eighth
Amendment requires all jurisdictions to allow defendants to present such
evidence to juries.
These courts that advocate for such evidence only to be evaluated by
an appellate court still conclude that such evidence is important.270 But if
266. See supra Part I.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 60–96.
268. See State v. Getsy, 702 N.E.2d 866, 892 (Ohio 1998) (reasoning that the U.S. Supreme
Court in Parker v. Dugger implied that a codefendant’s life sentence can be weighed as a
nonstatutory mitigating circumstance). But see Edwards v. State, 200 S.W.3d 500, 510 (Mo. 2006)
(en banc) (concluding that Parker made no such conclusion about the use of a codefendant’s
sentence under the U.S. Constitution).
269. See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text.
270. The Supreme Court might consider a middle approach, holding that the Constitution
requires such codefendant evidence to be weighed at least once. So such evidence would have to
be considered as a mitigating circumstance or for proportionality review (by the trial judge, an
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the Constitution does not require courts to admit evidence of a
codefendant’s sentence as mitigation, then in some jurisdictions, courts
may never consider the significance of a codefendant’s sentence before a
defendant is executed.271
Additionally, the proportionality review done by appellate courts
differs from the weighing done by jurors. For proportionality review, an
appellate court compares a defendant’s sentence against other cases to
determine whether the defendant’s sentence is excessive or
disproportionate in comparison to them.272 By contrast, at sentencing,
generally, a jury weighs all of the mitigating evidence together against
the aggravating factors.273 So, even in a case where an appellate court
might conclude that a defendant’s death sentence is not excessive
compared to other cases, a jury might see a codefendant’s lesser sentence
as enough of a mitigating factor to tip the balance in favor of a life
sentence. In this way, the issue of mitigation is separate from whether
there is proportionality review.
Furthermore, the mitigating factor would allow jurors to focus on
comparing the defendant’s case to any accomplices and their role in the
homicide. By contrast, proportionality review is a much broader
examination of all similar cases. Thus, the codefendant mitigating factor
works differently from appellate proportionality review while still
serving the proportionality policy goals.
C. Allowing a Codefendant’s Sentence as a Mitigating Factor Serves
the Death Penalty Goals of Retribution and Deterrence
On several occasions, the Supreme Court has stressed the importance
of the fact that capital punishment may serve the criminal justice policies
of retribution and deterrence. Allowing juries to weigh disparate
sentences among accomplices to the same murder will further serve those
goals of the criminal justice system.
In upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty in Gregg v.
Georgia,274 the plurality reasoned that it was constitutionally significant
that a state legislature may determine that death is an appropriate
appeals court, or both). While such a compromise would ignore the Court’s strong language
regarding mitigating circumstances, it would help address the Court’s concerns about fairness in
capital sentencing.
271. In such jurisdictions, not only is there no check on disparate sentences, but there is no
way to deter prosecutors from using conflicting theories in different trials involving codefendants.
See Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 182 (2005) (raising due process concerns about
prosecutors using conflicting theories in related cases).
272. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
273. See supra Part II.
274. 428 U.S. 153, 184–86 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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punishment for murder because the punishment serves the goals of
retribution and deterrence.275 The conclusion was important because the
Eighth Amendment requires that a punishment not “be so totally without
penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of
suffering.”276 Thus, the death penalty is only constitutional if a legislature
may reasonably determine that the death penalty serves the goals of
retribution and deterrence.
Capital punishment may serve the goals of retributive policy as “an
expression of society’s moral outrage at particularly offensive
conduct.”277 Retributive policy also requires that a defendant’s sentence
be proportionate to the crime.278 As noted above, in assessing
proportionality, it is useful to consider how other similar defendants are
treated. If equally culpable defendants are given different sentences,
retributive goals are not served by the unequal treatment. And the system
fails to serve the basic retributive goal of proportionality when two or
more equally culpable defendants in the same case are treated differently.
Because not all jurisdictions have appellate proportionality review, it is
essential that jurors assess a codefendant’s sentence to ensure the death
penalty serves basic retributive goals.
Similarly, for a punishment to be a deterrent to others, it must be
applied in a fair and predictable manner.279 If a punishment appears
random or unequal when equally culpable codefendants receive widely
different sentences, its deterrent value will be lessened.280 Therefore,
assuming capital punishment is more of a deterrent than a life sentence,
that deterrent value is undermined if a potential murderer would not
believe that an arbitrarily applied death penalty would be a possible
punishment.
275. Id. at 186–87 (“[T]he moral consensus concerning the death penalty and its social utility
as a sanction, require us to conclude, in the absence of more convincing evidence, that the
infliction of death as a punishment for murder is not without justification and thus is not
unconstitutionally severe.”).
276. Id. at 182–83.
277. Id. at 183.
278. Id. at 187 (“Finally, we must consider whether the punishment of death is
disproportionate in relation to the crime for which it is imposed.”). While the Gregg plurality
spoke of proportionality in the relation between the punishment and the crime, as discussed
earlier, in other cases the Court’s jurisprudence on proportionality has included a comparison of
crimes and defendants.
279. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 607, 612–18 (1999) (explaining that prosecutors have special obligations, which allows them
to “seek justice” through specific professional obligations).
280. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 184 F. Supp. 3d 1209, 1235–36 (D.N.M. 2016)
(citations omitted) (discussing a range of literature on deterrence and concluding that “[s]tudies
universally find that certainty of punishment has a far greater deterrent effect than severity of
punishment”).
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Thus, to ensure that the death penalty serves the goal of deterrence, as
well as retribution, equally culpable defendants—and especially
codefendants for the same crime—should receive similar punishments.
Or, at the least, a jury should consider and weigh the mitigating power of
a codefendant’s sentence. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the
important role that juries play in capital sentencing.281 For jurors to be
able to fully serve their role as the conscience of the community in
ensuring that capital punishment serves its constitutional goals, 282 they
need information such as if an equally culpable codefendant received a
sentence less than death.
D. A Constitutional Requirement for the Codefendant Mitigating
Factor Will Not Overly Broaden the Definition of Mitigating Factors
and Is Not Inconsistent with Oregon v. Guzek
Opponents of the use of evidence of a codefendant’s sentence may
argue that allowing such evidence as mitigating will overly broaden what
is defined as “mitigating.” Lower courts have rejected some factors that
one may argue are similar to a codefendant’s sentence.283 For example,
some defendants are prosecuted under federal law in states that do not
have the death penalty.284 So some federal capital defendants have
attempted to argue that the fact that the state does not have the death
penalty should be a mitigating circumstance in federal court.285 And, as
noted earlier, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected the
state’s lack of capital punishment as a mitigating factor.286
Still, a court should not preclude a codefendant’s sentence from being
mitigating out of fear that it might overly broaden the definition of
281. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968) (“[O]ne of the most
important functions any jury can perform in making . . . a selection [between life imprisonment
and death for a defendant convicted in a capital case] is to maintain a link between contemporary
community values and the penal system—a link without which the determination of punishment
would hardly reflect ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.’” (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958))).
282. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 615–16 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(stressing the importance of jury sentencing in death penalty cases to prevent arbitrariness).
283. See, e.g., Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 560, 579 (9th Cir. 2004).
284. See, e.g., United States v. Gabrion, 719 F.3d 511, 522 (6th Cir. 2013).
285. See, e.g., id.
286. Id. (“That Michigan lacks a death penalty has nothing to do with . . . [the defendant’s]
background or character.”). By contrast, the dissent argued that the evidence regarding the
location of the crime does seem to fit within the Supreme Court’s definition of mitigating evidence
as a “circumstance of the offense.” Id. at 540–41 (Moore, J., dissenting) (“A juror may have been
less inclined to impose the death penalty for a crime committed in Michigan if he knew that the
United States’s ability to prosecute the crime and impose a sentence of death was determined by
a distance roughly the length of a hockey rink.”); see also supra note 143 and accompanying text
(discussing the location of the crime in Gabrion).
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possible mitigating factors. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly used broad language in defining “mitigating circumstances”
in light of what a jury might “reasonably find . . . warrants a sentence less
than death.”287 So, allowing such evidence would be consistent with the
Court’s precedent and not broaden it.
Additionally, in arguing that a co-participant’s sentence is not
constitutionally required as a mitigating factor, one might compare this
potential mitigating factor to the “residual doubt” mitigating factor. One
of the rare times the Supreme Court arguably limited what constitutes a
mitigating factor is the Court’s treatment of the factor of “residual doubt,”
sometimes called “lingering doubt.”288 In residual doubt cases,
defendants have argued that during capital sentencing they should be able
to try to persuade jurors not to impose a death sentence on the basis that
they are not completely sure that the defendant is guilty of the murder.289
Some Supreme Court language implies that there is no constitutional
requirement to consider “residual doubt” as a mitigating circumstance.290
In Oregon v. Guzek,291 the Supreme Court found that the Constitution did
not require that courts allow capital defendants to introduce new evidence
at sentencing to support a mitigating argument of residual doubt about a
capital defendant's guilt.292 In Guzek, during the sentencing hearing, the
defendant wished to introduce new alibi evidence from the defendant’s

287. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 285 (2004) (quoting McKoy v. North Carolina, 494
U.S. 433, 441 (1990)).
288. Jennifer R. Treadway, ‘Residual Doubt’ in Capital Sentencing: No Doubt It Is an
Appropriate Mitigating Factor, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 215, 215–16 (1992).
289. Advocates of this mitigating circumstance argue that while a jury may convict someone
of murder “beyond a reasonable doubt,” society should not execute a defendant unless a higher
degree of guilt is established. See, e.g., id. (arguing residual doubt should be a mitigating factor);
see also Margery Malkin Koosed, Averting Mistaken Executions by Adopting the Model Penal
Code’s Exclusion of Death in the Presence of Lingering Doubt, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 41, 111–12
(2001) (arguing that requiring jurors to find guilt on a stronger standard than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt before proceeding to a capital penalty phase would lower the risk of wrongful
executions).
290. In Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988), the Court noted in dicta that a capital
defendant may not have a constitutional right to an instruction telling the jury to consider a
lingering doubt about the defendant's guilt as mitigating. Id. at 172–73. The Court reasoned that
such doubts are not part of a defendant’s “‘character,’ ‘record,’ or a ‘circumstance of the offense.’”
Id. at 174. But because the jury instructions in the case did not completely prohibit such
consideration, the Court did not resolve the issue. Id. at 175. Similarly, in Oregon v. Guzek, 546
U.S. 517 (2006), in addressing the right to present residual doubt evidence as a mitigating factor,
the Court clarified that it was not completely resolving the issue. Id. at 525.
291. 546 U.S. 517 (2006).
292. Id. at 526–27. Justice Scalia, however, wrote a concurring opinion joined by one other
Justice saying he would reject that the Eighth Amendment allows residual-doubt claims during
capital sentencing. Id. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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mother.293 Although Oregon law allowed a defendant to introduce any
transcript evidence at the sentencing, the defendant argued he should also
be allowed to introduce new testimony of innocence. 294 The Supreme
Court concluded that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do not give
a defendant the right to introduce new evidence to cast “residual doubt”
on the defendant’s guilt.295
The Court framed much of its analysis around allowing the state to
structure consideration of mitigating evidence rather than around
prohibiting a mitigating factor, stressing that “[s]tates are free to structure
and shape consideration of mitigating evidence ‘in an effort to achieve a
more rational and equitable administration of the death penalty.’”296
Although the Court did not find a constitutional right that allowed the
defendant in Guzek to introduce his new alibi evidence, the Court based
its reasoning on three aspects of the case. 297 First, the Court emphasized
that sentencing generally does not focus on questions of guilt.298 Second,
the Court noted that the residual doubt evidence addressed an issue that
was already addressed, that is, guilt.299 Third, the Court noted that
defendants in Oregon are not harmed by a prohibition on new residual
doubt evidence at sentencing because Oregon law allows defendants to
present to the sentencing jury the evidence of innocence from the original
trial.300 Thus, because Oregon still allowed innocence evidence from trial
to be argued at sentencing, the Court’s decision did not resolve the issue
of whether the Constitution ever requires courts to allow residual doubt
as a mitigating factor.301
Some lower courts have gone further to hold that once guilt is
established beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution does not require
that a defendant be allowed to argue the mitigating circumstance of
residual doubt.302 Similarly, in Holland v. Anderson,303 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a Mississippi capital defendant
293. Id. at 520.
294. Id. at 526–27 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 138.012(2)(b) (2003)).
295. Id. at 527.
296. Id. at 526 (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377 (1990)).
297. Id. at 526–27.
298. Id. at 526.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 526–27.
301. Id. at 525. The Guzek Court noted that “we once again face a situation where we need
not resolve whether such a right exists, for, even if it does, it could not extend so far as to provide
this defendant with a right to introduce the evidence at issue.” Id.
302. See, e.g., Homick v. State, 825 P.2d 600, 609–10 (Nev. 1992) (affirming a death
sentence and holding that the trial court did not err in refusing the defendant’s requested jury
instruction listing residual doubt as a mitigating circumstance because there is no constitutional
mandate); see also McKenna v. State, 968 P.2d 739, 749 (Nev. 1998) (same).
303. 583 F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 2009).
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could not introduce new testimony from a pathologist at sentencing to
rebut guilt evidence from the trial.304
If one were to read Guzek broadly,305 one might argue that Guzek
limits Lockett and Eddings and justifies allowing states similarly to
preclude codefendant evidence from a sentencing hearing. Arguably,
residual doubt is more relevant to a defendant’s character than a
codefendant’s sentence is, so if the Supreme Court allows the exclusion
of residual doubt evidence, then excluding evidence of a codefendant’s
sentence would not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The reasoning of Guzek, however, does not support a conclusion that
a state may preclude evidence of a co-participant’s life sentence. The
Court’s conclusion in Guzek was based on the reasoning that guilt
evidence is litigated at trial, and thus jurors already have access to that
information.306 In allowing states to preclude new evidence of innocence,
the Court reasoned that the harm to a defendant was minimal because of
the other opportunities to present evidence of innocence.307
By contrast, a capital defendant’s sentencing hearing may be the only
opportunity where a defendant can present evidence about a
codefendant’s sentence. Generally, the evidence will not already be
presented to a jury.308 Thus, the reasoning of Guzek, the rare case where
the Supreme Court rejected a mitigating factor, does not apply to support
banning evidence of a codefendant’s sentence as a mitigating factor. The
harm to a defendant is not minimal when a jury is not allowed to consider
and weigh the mitigating power of evidence of a co-participant’s
sentence.
E. It Is Not Impractical to Permit the Co-Participant Mitigating Factor
Another argument against allowing a co-participant’s sentence as a
mitigating factor is that such evidence has the potential to complicate the
defendant’s sentencing hearing. If a court provides a capital sentencing
jury with information that a co-participant received a life sentence, the
304. Id. at 280. Unlike Oregon, Mississippi did not have a statute that allowed the admission
of evidence of innocence from trial. Id. at 278. Still, the Holland court concluded that under
Guzek, a defendant “does not have the right to present evidence at resentencing that is inconsistent
with the verdict of the guilt-phase jury.” Id. at 280.
305. In contrast to Holland, one might reason that Guzek is a narrow decision, limited to the
situation in the case. There, the Court allowed a state to prohibit new evidence of innocence during
a sentencing hearing in a situation where the state already allowed the sentencing jury to consider
evidence of innocence submitted during the guilt trial. Guzek, 546 U.S. at 526–27. Thus, on the
facts and reasoning of the case, Guzek is a narrow holding, limited to where the jury knew of some
evidence of innocence already. See id. at 526–27.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. One rare exception would be where all of the defendants are tried and sentenced
together.
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issue arises whether or not the jury would also have to evaluate
differences between the co-participant and the defendant to evaluate
whether there are differences that justify the different sentences.
Courts may deal with this issue in a number of ways. One approach
would be to simplify the process. A jury could be presented with the fact
that a codefendant received a life sentence, and a judge may merely
instruct the jurors that they should recognize that each defendant is an
individual with individual circumstances, but the jury may consider the
sentence as mitigating if the jury wishes to do so.
Another approach is to allow parties to argue the differences once a
defendant presents a codefendant’s sentence as mitigating. In most cases,
the debate would not be complicated. Prosecutors could explain that a
disparity is justified because a codefendant was less responsible for the
murder due to different actions or different mental capabilities due to
mental illness or age. Prosecutors could also point out that a codefendant
had other mitigating factors that would justify a different sentence. And
a defense attorney could respond to the arguments. In fact, Arizona courts
have been able to use a system that allows juries to consider a
codefendant’s sentence when there is an “unexplained disparity” between
the sentences of the codefendant and the defendant on trial.309
Often, much of the evidence about a codefendant’s role in a crime
would already be presented at the guilt phase to show the facts of the
crime. And, while one may argue that these arguments add other factors
to the sentencing process, it would not be a bad thing. Furthermore, the
Court already permits evidence that can similarly complicate a sentencing
hearing, such as a prosecutor’s introduction of victim impact evidence.310
Considering the Eighth Amendment goals of eliminating arbitrariness
and instilling some thoughtful process in sentencing, it would be useful
to have the jury consider mitigation in concrete terms, comparing
defendants and evaluating how to balance different factors in determining
whether a defendant should live or die. Thus, any “complications” added
by allowing introduction of a mitigating circumstance would in fact make
sentencing more thoughtful and less arbitrary.
More importantly, every mitigating factor adds further complications
to the sentencing process. Facts about a defendant’s background often
result in the addition of a minitrial. So even if the mitigating factor of a
codefendant’s sentence adds more evidence for the jury to evaluate, that
fact does not justify eliminating the mitigating factor, especially when the
factor helps make the process more concrete and less arbitrary.
309. State v. Bearup, 211 P.3d 684, 695 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc) (quoting State v. Ellison, 140
P.3d 899, 923 (Ariz. 2006)).
310. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822–23 (1991) (holding that the Constitution does
not prohibit the prosecution from introducing evidence about the victim during sentencing if state
law allows it).
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A final response to concerns about complicating the process is that
there is proof that the sentencing system can work with the use of
evidence of a codefendant’s sentence. Jurisdictions that already allow the
mitigating factor are able to allow the evidence without overburdening
the system. While two states that often consider this factor—Arizona and
Florida—have in the past had greater involvement of judges in capital
sentencing than many other states,311 there is no reason that jurors are not
able to effectively balance this mitigating factor, and jurors have done so
in practice.
There are some additional arguments one may make to support the
conclusion that courts should not be required to permit the introduction
of a codefendant’s sentence as mitigation. For example, one might argue
that if such evidence may be submitted by a defendant, then a prosecutor
should be able to introduce evidence that a codefendant was sentenced to
death. Such an argument neglects the constitutional mandate surrounding
mitigating evidence. Under Lockett and other cases, the Eighth
Amendment gives a defendant the right to introduce mitigating
evidence.312 There is no similar constitutional right for prosecutors to
submit anything that is aggravating. Thus, the constitutional requirement
applies only to a defendant’s introduction of mitigating evidence.
An additional argument against the requirement for such mitigating
evidence is that in a case of two codefendants tried separately, the
defendant tried first would not be able to use as mitigating the fact that
the defendant tried second received a life sentence. Therefore, the
argument goes, whether one may get the benefit of this mitigating factor
may arbitrarily depend on which defendant is tried first.
Jurisdictions with proportionality review have also addressed the
timing issue in that context, allowing whatever evidence is available at
the time of review. In Griffin v. State,313 the Florida Supreme Court
explained that
“[e]ven when a codefendant has been sentenced subsequent
to the sentencing of the defendant seeking review on direct
appeal, it is proper for this Court to consider the propriety of
the disparate sentences in order to determine whether a death

311. Until relatively recently, Arizona had judges do the sentencing in capital cases, while
judges in Florida impose sentences after juries recommend the appropriate sentence. See, e.g.,
Maria T. Kolar, “Finding” a Way to Complete the Ring of Capital Jury Sentencing, 95 DENV. L.
REV. 671, 681, 683 (2018).
312. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978).
313. 114 So. 3d 890 (Fla. 2013).
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sentence is appropriate given the conduct of all participants
in committing the crime.”314
More importantly, the possibility of such a timing situation is not a
reason to deny a defendant the constitutional right to submit any available
mitigating evidence. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that
mitigating evidence may develop after a defendant is sentenced to death,
and that such a development does not create a constitutional problem.315
Thus, it would not create a constitutional problem if one defendant were
not able to use such evidence and another one were. Further, even
assuming there is some level of nonconstitutional unfairness, such a
possibility does not undermine the other reasons the Constitution
demands that a defendant be able to submit such evidence. Additionally,
a defendant who was tried first and sentenced to death would be able to
use a co-participant’s later life sentence for arguments during clemency
proceedings, retrials, and resentencing hearings.316
Some may argue that it is unfair to consider a codefendant’s life
sentence as mitigating when the codefendants may have been less
culpable. But a jury could still consider those facts. The issue is not how
mitigating a codefendant’s sentence should be, but whether it should be
mitigating at all. The answer to the latter question is that a jury should be
able to consider a co-participant’s non-death sentence as mitigating, and
from there the jury may consider how mitigating it should be.
Finally, one problem remains even if the Supreme Court concludes
that the Constitution requires jurors to consider a co-participant’s
sentence as a mitigating factor. Each juror brings their own beliefs to the
jury room, so that how much weight a mitigating factor receives may vary
drastically from juror to juror. One study by the Capital Juror Project
found that jurors generally give different weight to different mitigating
factors.317 The study found that only about a fifth of jurors would give
314. Id. at 910 (alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. Dugger, 604 So. 2d 465, 468 (Fla.
1992)).
315. See Evans v. Virginia, 471 U.S. 1025, 1028–29 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). While
the development of new mitigating evidence after sentencing may not justify a new sentencing
hearing on its own, such evidence would be admitted if a new sentencing hearing were granted
on other grounds. Id. Wilbert Evans was sentenced to death based on the aggravating factor of
future dangerousness and was eventually executed. Id. While on death row, he had saved the lives
of prison personnel when other inmates had attempted to escape, and he later asked courts to
consider his post-sentence actions. See, e.g., Meghan Shapiro, An Overdose of Dangerousness:
How “Future Dangerousness” Catches the Least Culpable Capital Defendants and Undermines
the Rationale for the Executions It Supports, 35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 145, 180–81 (2008).
316. Adam M. Gershowitz, Rethinking the Timing of Capital Clemency, 113 MICH. L. REV.
1, 18–19 (2014).
317. See Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors
Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1539 (1998).
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mitigating weight to the fact that a codefendant received a life
sentence.318
So, one may argue that admitting evidence of a co-participant’s
sentence may make little difference. Or if it does make a difference, it
will be arbitrary when it does make a difference.
These arguments, however, may apply to the use of any mitigating
factor or the introduction of almost any piece of evidence at trial. Jurors
will weigh evidence based on their own understandings, intelligence, and
experience. That fact is not a reason to exclude evidence or to interpret
the Constitution one way or the other. And, the study still found that a
significant portion of jurors do give as much weight to evidence of a
codefendant’s sentence as they do for other mitigating factors currently
allowed.319 Thus, the empirical evidence further supports that a factfinder
could reasonably deem evidence of a codefendant’s sentence to have
mitigating value.
Concluding that the Constitution requires trial judges to permit the use
of a co-participant’s sentence as a mitigating circumstance is not the same
as requiring a jury to reduce a defendant’s sentence. In our current jury
system, we must trust jurors to weigh the value of a co-participant’s
sentence after hearing arguments by both the defense attorney and the
prosecutor. It is the same faith that allows jurors to weigh other mitigating
factors like the relevance of a defendant’s abuse as a child, or a capital
defendant’s depression, or that the defendant suffered from borderline
personality disorder.320 In more egregious cases, such evidence about a
co-participant likely will make little difference. And, if there is clearly a
difference in the culpability between a defendant and a codefendant, a
jury may downplay the different sentences. But in cases where the
culpability of the defendant and codefendant are very similar or where
the codefendant is more culpable, the jury should be allowed to weigh
whether, along with other mitigating and aggravating factors, the
evidence should affect the defendant’s sentence.

318. Id. at 1562–65.
319. Id. As in the case of the mitigating factor of a codefendant’s life sentence, only onefifth of jurors said they would give weight to the mitigating factors of lack of a criminal record
and that the crime was committed under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Id.
320. As noted earlier, the Court has sanctioned a broad range of mitigating factors. See, e.g.,
Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 10–11 (2009) (allowing evidence of borderline personality
disorder); Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286, 289–90 (2007) (allowing evidence of depression);
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 525 (2003) (allowing evidence that the defendant lived in many
foster homes and was sexually abused as a child); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)
(allowing evidence of youth and abusive family history).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

51

Florida Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 4 [], Art. 3

1068

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

CONCLUSION
While the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on mitigating factors
focuses on the concept of individualized sentencing and not
proportionality, the concept of proportionality has been important to the
Court since the beginning of the modern death penalty era. And if the
Court does not mandate—and some states decline to adopt—
proportionality review, juries may help make the death penalty fairer if
they consider evidence regarding a co-participant’s sentence.
More importantly, in a capital case, the Constitution requires that
juries be permitted to consider evidence of a codefendant’s sentence.
Although “[c]ourts determine whether evidence is constitutionally
relevant, . . . that evidence is relied upon by the jury to make a reasoned
moral judgment.”321 The Court has consistently found that the
constitutional command and the definition of “mitigating circumstances”
is broad. Evidence regarding a codefendant’s sentence does tell the jury
important information about the crime at issue and about the defendant’s
role, as it reflects the relative culpability of the codefendant and the
defendant. Additionally, such evidence tells a jury how others have
weighed some of that information. Such evidence provides a jury with
evidence that a factfinder could reasonably deem to have mitigating
value.
Although several jurisdictions do not require courts to consider such
evidence, the Supreme Court should clarify that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments do require courts to permit juries to weigh
evidence of a codefendant’s prison sentence when a capital defendant
submits such evidence as a mitigating factor. Beyond the constitutionality
of the factor, a number of courts have already illustrated that not only is
the use of such evidence helpful, but it is possible for jurors to evaluate
such evidence without causing confusion or overburdening the legal
system.
Since the modern death penalty era began in the 1970s, the Court has
continued to struggle to create a fairer and less arbitrary death penalty
system out of the requirements of the Constitution. Arbitrariness
remains.322 And while the law may never achieve perfect fairness in the
way the death penalty is distributed, it should allow jurors to use every
piece of relevant information that helps them use their moral judgment to
move the system nearer toward that goal.323

321. United States v. Gabrion, 719 F.3d 511, 541 (6th Cir. 2013) (Moore, J., dissenting).
322. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 302 (1987) (explaining that where
discretion is afforded, it must minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action).
323. See, e.g., Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 170 (1994) (holding that due
process requires jurors have access to information about what constitutes a life sentence).
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